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MAKING SENSE OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Monica Hakimi*
This Article addresses a longstanding puzzle about customary international
law (CIL): How can it be, at once, so central to the practice of international
law—routinely invoked and applied in a broad range of settings—and the
source of such persistent confusion and derision? The centrality of CIL suggests that, for the many people who use it, it is not only comprehensible but
worthwhile. They presumably use it for a reason. But then, what accounts for
all the muddle and disdain?
The Article argues that the problem lies less in the everyday operation of CIL
than in the conceptual baggage that is brought to bear on it. Most contemporary accounts of CIL reflect what can be called a “rulebook conception.” They
presuppose that, in order for a given proposition to be CIL, it must apply
more or less in the same way in all cases of a given type, rather than fluctuate
without established criteria from one situation to the next. This rulebook
conception is wrong. It does not accurately describe the range of normative
material that global actors, in the ordinary course, use and treat as CIL. And
because it is wrong, it systematically sows confusion and leads analysists to
devalue CIL as a kind of international law. We should stop imagining that
CIL operates like a rulebook and should recognize that it is an inherently
contingent and variable kind of law.
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INTRODUCTION
Customary international law (CIL) is central to the practice of international law. On several important issues, including the conduct of hostilities
in civil wars 1 and the immunity of foreign states from national jurisdiction, 2
CIL defines most of the content of international law; it is the main mode of
international regulation. In other areas—for example, the jus ad bellum,
which governs when states may use force across national borders 3—CIL applies concurrently with and helps fill interstices in treaty texts. 4 Elsewhere, it
serves to extend to states that are not party to a treaty the main content of
that treaty, as it does for the United States and the U.N. Convention on the

1. See, e.g., MARCO SASSÒLI ET AL., 1 HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?: CASES,
DOCUMENTS AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 65 (3d ed. 2011); SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 105–07 (2012).
2. See, e.g., ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 232–33 (8th ed. 2019).
3. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 187–95 (June 27); OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (Christopher
Sutcliffe trans., 2010) (“Scarcely any commentators today are prepared to question the importance of custom in the debates surrounding the scope of the prohibition on the use of
force.”).
4. Because CIL often intersects with and helps inform the content of treaty law, my
argument in this Article extends to many areas of international law that are also regulated by
treaties. The jus ad bellum is a good example. I discuss it at some length in Sections IV and
V.B.2.
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Law of the Sea. 5 And beyond its specific policy prescriptions, CIL establishes
a host of background principles that undergird the entire legal order: on the
types of rights and duties that accompany statehood, 6 the conditions for
holding states responsible, 7 and much more.
Yet CIL has also long been shrouded in confusion and skepticism. It is
an amorphous kind of law that neither enters into force on a date certain nor
derives from binding texts. It forms more organically, through an interactive
and highly informal legal process. 8 International lawyers still struggle to explain when and why particular norms emerge from this process as CIL. 9 And
because CIL can be so hard to pin down, many contend that it is deficient as
law—lacking in the legitimacy 10 or the efficacy 11 that we usually associate
with law. These criticisms of CIL are not new, but they have lingered. 12 They
suggest that CIL has little value in the world and might even be harmful.
CIL thus presents something of a puzzle: How can it be, at once, so
prominent in the practice of international law—routinely invoked and applied in a broad range of settings—and the source of such persistent confusion and derision? Its prominence suggests that, for the many people who

5. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 378 (Mar.
10, 1983); The Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.S. NAVY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S
CORPS, https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_law_of_the_sea.htm [https://perma.cc
/FP6W-HY7G].
6. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–15 (6th ed. 2008).
7. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, at 43, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC, Articles on State Responsibility].
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Section II.B; see also, e.g., David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept
of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L
L. 198, 198 (1996) (“[I]s CIL . . . a riddle inside a mystery wrapped in an enigma?”).
10. See, e.g., JEAN D’ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A THEORY OF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF LEGAL RULES 164 (2011) (describing CIL as “dangerously indeterminate” such that its “authority is gravely enfeebled”); J. Patrick Kelly, The
Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 451 (2000) (asserting that CIL
is so “indeterminate and manipulable” that it “cannot function as a legitimate source of substantive legal norms”).
11. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 23–43 (2005) (“Our claim is . . . that [CIL] is not an exogenous influence on state behavior.”); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 124
(2005) (“[T]he lack of precision in CIL rules does indeed undermine the force of the rules and
generate skepticism about their importance.”).
12. See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2018) (arguing that “CIL rules embody ‘hegemonic’ ideas and beliefs”);
Daniel H. Joyner, Why I Stopped Believing in Customary International Law, 9 ASIAN J. INT’L L.
35 (2019); Joel P. Trachtman, The Growing Obsolescence of Customary International Law, in
CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 172, 172 (Curtis A. Bradley
ed., 2016) [hereinafter CUSTOM’S FUTURE] (“[I]t is unimaginable that customary international
law (CIL) can provide effective mechanisms by which to address [modern global governance]
challenges.”).
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use it, it is not only comprehensible but worthwhile. They presumably use it
for a reason. But then, what accounts for all the muddle and disdain?
I argue in this Article that the problem lies less in the everyday practice
of CIL than in the conceptual baggage that is brought to bear on it. Most
contemporary accounts of CIL reflect what can be called a “rulebook conception.” They presuppose that CIL manifests as a body of rules. In using the
word “rule” here, I am not drawing the common distinction between rules
and standards. I am lumping together the broad range of legal norms that
might qualify as rules or standards. A rule can be precise and rigid, allowing
little discretion in the course of its application. Or it can be more flexible and
fact dependent. What makes it a rule for my purposes is that its main content is both discernible and generalizable. In the rulebook conception, CIL
consists entirely of rules; a given proposition can be CIL only if it applies
more or less in the same way in all cases of a given type, rather than fluctuates without established criteria from one situation to the next.
The rulebook conception is especially evident in CIL orthodoxy. In
2018, the U.N. International Law Commission adopted 13 and the U.N. General Assembly endorsed a set of Conclusions on Identification of Customary
International Law (the ILC Conclusions). 14 Like other orthodox accounts of
CIL, the ILC Conclusions present CIL as a body of primary and secondary
rules. 15 Primary rules directly regulate behavior. They define who must do
what, in what circumstances, and subject to what consequences. The prohibition of genocide is an example. Secondary rules establish criteria for identifying the primary rules. According to the ILC Conclusions, the
metasecondary rule for CIL is a two-element test, under which a normative
position is CIL only if states widely support it in their: (1) practice, and (2)
opinio juris—meaning their acceptance that the position is not just good policy but law. 16 The Conclusions then articulate other secondary rules to expand on that test. Their driving premise is that CIL consists of a bunch of
identifiable and generally applicable rules. 17 That premise is what defines the
rulebook conception.
The rulebook conception is not limited to orthodox accounts of CIL. It
informs, in deep and subtle ways, how most international lawyers analyze

13. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10
(2018) [hereinafter ILC, Conclusions on CIL].
14. G.A. Res. 73/203, ¶ 4 (Dec. 20, 2018) (italics omitted) (bringing the ILC Conclusions
“to the attention of States and all who may be called upon to identify rules of customary international law, and encourag[ing] their widest possible dissemination”).
15. On primary and secondary rules, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–99
(3d ed. 2012).
16. ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 124, 135 (Conclusions 2, 8). The ILC
Conclusions recognize that the practice of international organizations can also contribute to
CIL, but they underscore that “[t]he requirement of a general practice, as a constituent element
of customary international law, refers primarily to the practice of States.” Id. at 130 (Conclusion 4).
17. For an elaboration on this point, see infra Section II.A.
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CIL, the many projects that they have initiated to codify CIL, and their frequent debates on and criticisms of CIL. 18 I intend to show that it is not only
wrong but pernicious. The idea that CIL must operate like a rulebook contributes to the confusion and skepticism on CIL.
My argument begins with a straightforward descriptive claim: in the
day-to-day operation of international law, CIL works nothing like a rulebook. The normative material that global actors in the ordinary course recognize and treat as CIL does not derive from stable secondary rules and does
not manifest only as primary rules. It emerges more enigmatically, and much
of its content is more contingent than the rulebook allows. This does not
mean that CIL never functions like rules. Some of its conduct norms display
rule-like levels of clarity and stability. (The prohibition of genocide is again
illustrative.) But many do not, and even when they do, it is not because they
satisfy certain secondary rules. Put simply, the rulebook conception reflects
what many people imagine CIL to be, but it does not describe what global
actors use and receive as CIL in the everyday practice of law. It does not reflect what CIL “is” as a real-world sociological phenomenon.
This descriptive claim is not entirely new. International lawyers to some
extent appreciate that CIL is not really like a rulebook—that it is more unstable and fragmentary than any rulebook would be. 19 Still, the rulebook
conception structures their thinking. When they come to describing, analyzing, or appraising CIL, they usually do so through the lens and with the blinders of the rulebook conception. 20
That approach to CIL is unsound. Because CIL does not actually conform to a rulebook, assessing it as if it does is wrongheaded. Methods of legal
analysis that are suitable for a rulebook are inapt for CIL. Lawyers who use
these methods to examine or to advise clients on CIL will routinely be misdirected or confused. 21 Likewise, normative appraisals that reflect the rulebook
conception—that presuppose that CIL is or should be like a rulebook—
consistently devalue CIL. They both exaggerate the problems with CIL and
fail to account for the important functions that it serves by not conforming
to a rulebook. As I will explain, the qualities of CIL that make it unlike a
rulebook are part of how it works to limit bias in the law, achieve normative
settlements through law, and advance values that are associated with the rule
of law. 22
In short, there are good reasons to change how we think about CIL—to
retire the rulebook conception and recognize that CIL is a contingent and
variable kind of law. Doing so would help us understand the practice of CIL,
advise those who might participate in this practice, evaluate when and why it
is valuable, and identify suitable proposals for reform. Moreover, although
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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these issues are longstanding in CIL, they have some urgency. Precisely because CIL does not conform to a rulebook, it is well suited for periods of uncertainty, contest, and change. With the rise of nationalist movements in
many parts of the world, 23 the associated efforts to withdraw from or otherwise circumscribe key treaty obligations, 24 an overall retreat from international law’s humanitarian impulses, 25 and the broader geopolitical shifts that
make existing legal arrangements susceptible to disruption, 26 we can expect
global actors to turn more readily to CIL to address their regulatory challenges. They will not maximize CIL’s potential unless they understand how it
works and can assess when and why it is worth their time.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the foundation for my argument by describing the legal process for CIL. Nothing in this Part of the Article should be controversial. The process for creating and using CIL is
known to be highly unstructured. Yet those who adhere to the rulebook conception persistently relegate this process to the background of their analysis.
They treat the process as if it is somehow distinct from the rules that comprise CIL. 27 I am foregrounding the process because I argue that it largely
defines CIL. The reason that CIL’s normative content is often disjointed and
mercurial is that that is what the CIL process produces. Having a clear picture of this process thus is essential to understanding CIL.
Part II elaborates on the rulebook conception and shows that, despite
persistent debates about CIL, this conception is pervasive. It animates most
contemporary thinking on CIL. The remainder of the Article then challenges
the rulebook conception along three dimensions: (1) descriptive, (2) analytic,
and (3) normative. Part III argues that the rulebook conception is inaccurate.
It does not describe the normative material that is routinely accepted and
23. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2019); Heike Krieger, Populist Governments and International Law, 30
EUR. J. INT’L L. 971 (2019); Alain Pellet, Values and Power Relations—The ‘Disillusionment’ of
International Law?, (Berlin Potsdam Research Grp., KFG Working Paper No. 34, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3400689 [https://perma.cc/C8F9-N2LS].
24. See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, Why Should We Care About International Law?, 118
MICH. L. REV. 1283 (2020) (discussing recent U.S. actions); Laurence R. Helfer, Treaty Exit and
Intrabranch Conflict at the Interface of International and Domestic Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 355 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019)
(discussing other recent examples).
25. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human Rights, 9 J. HUM. RTS.
PRAC. 1 (2017); Yu-Jie Chen, China’s Challenge to the International Human Rights Regime, 51
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1179 (2019); Douglas Guilfoyle, Part I–This Is Not Fine: The International Criminal Court in Trouble, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ithis-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/ [https://perma.cc/2ZG5-8582].
26. See, e.g., Graham Allison, The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to
Conventional Wisdom, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.–Aug. 2018, at 124; Tom Ginsburg, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture 2019, Lecture Three: Authoritarian International Law? (Mar. 14,
2019) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
27. E.g., ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 124 (“Dealing as they do with the
identification of rules of customary international law, the draft conclusions do not address,
directly, the processes by which customary international law develops over time.”).
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used as CIL in the practice of law. Part IV contends that, because the rulebook conception is inaccurate, it is not a suitable framework for analyzing
CIL. It prioritizes legal methods that are inapt for CIL. Part V argues that it
also contaminates most normative appraisals of CIL. The rulebook conception obscures the good work that CIL does by not conforming to a rulebook,
so it leads appraisers systematically to debase CIL as a kind of international
law. By the end of the Article, I ask: If the rulebook conception is inaccurate,
if it distorts rather than sharpens the legal analysis, and if it discounts much
of the good that CIL does, why are we holding onto it? Why shouldn’t we
change how we think about CIL?
I. A PRIMER ON PROCESS
The frustrations with CIL stem directly from the process for making, invoking, and applying it. This process is unstructured and heterarchical. In
the ordinary course, states and other global actors say and do things to advance their own priorities and “ ‘bid’ and ‘barter’ and ‘trade’ in new rules of
conduct.” 28 The positions that they take in these interactions are sometimes
just statements of fact or preference. But more often, the positions embed
assertions about governance authority. They put at issue the question of how
or by whom authority may be exercised. This element of authority makes
them claims about the law.
To illustrate, imagine that a state decides to build a hydroelectric power
plant along a shared river without first consulting with or accounting for the
environmental risks to its neighbors. The state that makes the decision signals more than that it thinks the plant is good policy. It also signals that it
believes that it has jurisdiction to build the plant as it pleases. The decision
embeds a claim about the law—about the proper locus of governance authority. Likewise, neighboring states that contest the decision might just express their displeasure. But if they argue that the acting state overstepped its
authority and intruded on theirs, they too would advance a legal claim.
Such claims are routine in international life. They are made all the time,
in manifold settings, without any overarching organizing principle for prioritizing among them. Some legal claims are advanced in collective fora, such
as international organizations. Others appear in unilateral pronouncements.
Still others are communicated nonverbally, through concrete actions or reactions in discrete settings. The disparate claims and counterclaims that are
presented through this process are all part of the CIL mix. They are the raw
data that help to define CIL.
A central question for those who participate in or want to analyze these
data is methodological: How are we supposed to distinguish mere claims
about the law, which are common and often contradictory, from normative
positions that actually have authority as law? I return to this question be-

28.

DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (2002).
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low. 29 For now, I underscore that the nature of the CIL process itself complicates the answer. 30 Consider three reasons why.
First, the process does not have formal controls that inhibit the participants from pushing hard for their preferred positions. Tendentious or controversial CIL claims are common and often presented as if they simply
describe the positive law. 31 What demarcates them as dubious are the contrary claims of other participants. However, even when a claim is contested, it
becomes part of the CIL mix and has the potential to affect the law’s content.
The fact that a claim is opportunistic does not necessarily diminish its legal
relevance. 32
Second, authority in this process is diffusely held. Although individual
actors can easily advance claims about the law, none can alone establish the
law. No one entity is entitled to assess the various claims on an issue, weed
out the outliers, and finally settle CIL’s normative content. This does not
mean that all CIL claims have equal weight. They do not. Some participants
in the process are more effective at shaping expectations about CIL than are
others. 33 For example, despite the common refrain that states are the main
drivers of CIL, 34 other actors—international adjudicators, 35 intergovernmental bodies, 36 and certain nongovernmental experts 37—can be extremely influ-

29. See infra Sections II.A, II.B, III.B.
30. See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/663 (May 17,
2013) [hereinafter Wood, First Report on CIL] (recognizing the “inherent difficulties” and
“complexity of assessing the existence of a rule of customary international law”).
31. See, e.g., ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
21 (2007) (“Uncertainties about the existence and content of rules of customary [international]
law allow opportunistic claims . . . .”).
32. For evidence, see the example on the continental shelf infra in notes 124–127 and
accompanying text.
33. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den., Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43
(Feb. 20) (explaining that states that are especially invested in an issue can play an outsized
role); Michael Byers, Introduction: Power, Obligation, and Customary International Law, 11
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81, 84 (2001) (same for powerful states).
34. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction Between Customary International Law and
Treaties, 322 RECUEIL DES COURS 243, 267 (2006) (“[States] have a quasi-monopoly over the
formation of custom . . . .”); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International
Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 135 (2007) (“What is remarkable in this literature [on
CIL] is that virtually all of it has accepted the core premise that only states can form CIL.”).
35. See, e.g., SHANE DARCY, JUDGES, LAW AND WAR: THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 80 (2014) (on international criminal tribunals); Antonio Cassese, The International Court of Justice: It Is High Time to Restyle the Respected Old Lady, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 240 (Antonio Cassese
ed., 2012) (on the ICJ); Christian J Tams, The ICJ as a ‘Law-Formative Agency’: Summary and
Synthesis, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 377, 379 (Christian J Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013) (on the ICJ).
36. See ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 130 (Conclusion 4.2).
37. See, e.g., Fernando Lusa Bordin, Reflections of Customary International Law: The
Authority of Codification Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International Law, 63 INT’L &
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ential. The normative positions that these actors take on CIL often carry
considerable authority. But unless an actor is specifically charged with resolving a concrete dispute under CIL, its authority to define CIL will be incomplete and contestable. 38
Third, because the CIL process is unstructured, it lacks an end point. It
is always ongoing. 39 Any incident that puts a particular normative position at
issue thus contributes new data that can alter the position’s CIL status or
content. 40 A position that is endorsed might get more entrenched as CIL. A
position that is ignored might lose its legal relevance. A position that is applied in novel ways might acquire new meaning. And so on. The critical
point is that, because the CIL process is continuous, a position’s status or
content within CIL can be transitory and elusive.
A concrete example illustrates how the process plays out. In 1998, an elderly Italian man named Luigi Ferrini sued Germany in Italian court for his
forced deportation and labor during World War II. The case, Ferrini v. Repubblica Federale di Germania, put in conflict two distinct strands of CIL. 41
The first is on foreign state immunity. CIL generally prohibits states from
exercising national jurisdiction over other states for their public sovereign, as
opposed to their private or commercial, conduct. 42 The second strand of CIL
concerns the commission of atrocities. CIL not only prohibits atrocities but
also declares them to be contrary to the fundamental precepts of the legal
order 43 and subject to distinct remedial schemes. 44 The question in Ferrini
was whether Germany’s “immunity from jurisdiction is capable of operating
even in respect of conduct which . . . is so extremely serious that, in the context of customary international law, it belongs to that category of interna-

COMP. L.Q. 535, 542–46 (2014) (on the International Law Commission); infra notes 81, 129–
140 and accompanying text (on the International Committee of the Red Cross).
38. For more on this point, see infra Section III.B.
39. See Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272
RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 188 (1998) (“[T]he customary law process is a continuing one . . . .”);
K. Wolfke, Some Persistent Controversies Regarding Customary International Law, 24 NETH.
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 15 (1993) (“[A]scertaining international customs and the formulation of the
corresponding legal rules may be carried out repeatedly on various occasions. Such identification is never final . . . .”).
40. See Mendelson, supra note 39, at 175–76; W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4–5
(1984).
41. Cass., sez un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro it. 2207, I, 936 (It.), translated in 128
I.L.R. 659, 665 (Elihu Lauterpacht et al. eds., 2007).
42. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 2, at 232–33.
43. See, e.g., Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, Fourth Report on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), at 21–62, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/727,
(Jan. 31, 2019) (listing atrocity prohibitions as among the norms that are widely cited as jus
cogens).
44. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; ILC, Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, at art. 26, 40–41.
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tional crimes which are so prejudicial to universal values that they transcend
the interests of individual States.” 45
In 2004, Italy’s Court of Cassation decided that Germany was not entitled to immunity for its atrocities in Italy during World War II. 46 The Italian
government questioned Ferrini’s logic, but the court held firm in later cases. 47 It did so even as it recognized that its position on CIL was tendentious.
The court explained that, although “there existed no definite and explicit international custom according to which the immunity of the foreign
State . . . could be deemed to have been derogated from in respect
of . . . ‘crimes against humanity,’ ” Ferrini and its progeny “contributed to the
emergence of [that] rule.” 48 According to the court, its move to push CIL in
that direction—to create an exception to immunity for cases involving atrocities—was not in any way improper. It was “inherent in the system of the international legal order,” just part of how the CIL process works. 49
Eventually, Germany contested the Italian court’s exercise of jurisdiction
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ decided in Jurisdictional Immunities that Germany was entitled to immunity for the acts in
question. 50 That decision is binding on Italy under the U.N. Charter. 51
Moreover, because of the ICJ’s pride of place in the international legal system, its position on foreign state immunity is widely understood to be authoritative. Other actors cite the Jurisdictional Immunities decision as
evidence of CIL. 52 Nevertheless, Italy’s Constitutional Court declined to follow it for reasons of domestic law. The Constitutional Court’s contrary position on foreign state immunity put Italy in violation of the Charter and, most
would say, CIL. But as the court noted, its position might still “contribute to
a desirable—and desired by many—evolution of international law.” 53 Although the ICJ’s position was for the time being authoritative, it was also contestable. It was subject to disruption through the same process that brought
it about. Because authority in this process is diffusely held, no actor—not
even the ICJ—has the final say on its content.

45. Ferrini, 128 I.L.R. at 665.
46. Id. at 674.
47. See Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of
State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), ¶¶ 26–27 (June 12, 2009), https://www.icj-cij.org/files
/case-related/143/16644.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELG6-9GDU] (describing this sequence of
events).
48. Id. at ¶ 27 (translating and quoting the Court of Cassation’s post-Ferrini orders).
49. Id.
50. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. 99, 155 (Feb. 2).
51. U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1.
52. E.g., Jones v. United Kingdom, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
53. Corte Cost., 22 ottobre 2014, n. 238, Foro. it. 2015, I, 1152 (It.), translated in Judgement No. 238 - Year 2014, CORTE COSTITUZIONALE ¶ 3.3, https://www.cortecostituzionale.it
/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S238_2013_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZRZ29HVR].
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THE RULEBOOK CONCEPTION

We can now return to the methodological question that occupies so
much attention: How do we determine whether particular normative positions that are advanced through the CIL process have the authority of law?
Orthodox accounts of CIL answer this question with a two-element test. A
normative position is said to be CIL only if a sufficiently large and representative group of states supports it in their: (1) settled practice, and (2)
opinio juris. 54 This test both reflects and entrenches the rulebook conception
of CIL. It depicts CIL as a set of discernible, generally applicable rules. And
although international lawyers routinely debate how best to formulate and
identify the rules, they overwhelmingly share that premise; they presuppose
that CIL must be like a rulebook.
A. Theoretical Foundations
The rulebook conception is a particular vision of what CIL must be. Its
central premise is that CIL must manifest as a body of rules—more specifically, that a proposition can be CIL only if it applies more or less in the same
way in all cases of a given type, rather than vacillates without discernible criteria from one situation to the next. 55 In this conception, CIL’s content is
both objectively identifiable and generally applicable.
Orthodox accounts depict CIL as a body of primary and secondary rules.
The ILC Conclusions are the most systematic and authoritative effort to date
to articulate the secondary rules. 56 As the ILC explains, the Conclusions “seek
to offer practical guidance”—also “clear guidance”—“on how the existence
of [primary] rules of customary international law, and their content, are to
be determined.” 57 The ILC does not contend that the Conclusions have the
degree of precision of, say, an architectural plan. It recognizes that they require some context specificity in the course of their application. 58 Still, it pre-

54. E.g., ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 124, 135 (Conclusions 2, 8).
55. To be clear, international lawyers might disagree about which propositions satisfy
this definition and qualify as rules. My point is that they take that to be the critical question;
they conceive of CIL as a body of rules.
56. See Georg Nolte, How to Identify Customary International Law? – On the Final Outcome of the Work of the International Law Commission (2018), at 5 (Berlin Potsdam Research
Grp., KFG Working Paper No. 37, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3402384 [https://perma.cc/HU2C-RWFR]. The International Law Association has also
produced a high-profile account of the secondary rules of CIL. See Int’l Law Ass’n, Comm. on
Formation of Customary Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General
Customary International Law (2000). This account was controversial on some issues, but it still
reflected the rulebook conception. It still presupposed that CIL consists of a mix of primary
and secondary rules.
57. ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 122, 123.
58. Id. at 127 (“Whether a general practice that is accepted as law (accompanied by
opinio juris) exists must be carefully investigated in each case, in the light of the relevant circumstances.”).
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sents them as if they are secondary rules. It intends for them to establish objective criteria that apply across the board, whenever the CIL status or content of a normative position is at issue.
Like other orthodox accounts, the ILC Conclusions begin with the twoelement test. 59 The accompanying commentary explains that this test must
be satisfied “in any given case” involving CIL. 60 “The test must always be: is
there a general practice that is accepted as law?” 61 The ILC Conclusions then
articulate other secondary rules to refine the test. They explain that the “requirement of a general practice . . . refers primarily to the practice of
States.” 62 This practice “must be sufficiently widespread and representative,
as well as consistent.” 63 It “must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or
obligation” such that it is distinguishable “from mere usage or habit.” 64 And
so forth. The point is that the ILC Conclusions purport to define the secondary rules of CIL. They are meant to apply “[i]n each case” in which CIL is at
issue in order “to ensure that a [primary] rule of customary international law
is properly identified.” 65
In addition, they presuppose that particular normative positions can satisfy the secondary rules and qualify as CIL only if they too are rules. The
qualities that make a position CIL under the ILC Conclusions—
generalizability, widespread adherence, representativeness, and consistency—also make it like a rule. They mean that the position’s core content is
both coherent and consistently applied. To be clear, the ILC does not contend that CIL’s primary rules are always universal in scope. It explains that,
although they usually are “binding on all States,” their scope of application
can be more limited. 66 But even in these unusual circumstances, a normative
position can be CIL only if it prescribes more or less the same thing in all
circumstances in which it applies. It must display rule-like levels of coherence and generalizability. If it does not, the ILC suggests, it cannot be CIL.
“Where the existence of a general practice accepted as law cannot be established, the conclusion will be that the alleged rule of customary international
law does not exist.” 67
The ILC Conclusions purport to “describe the current state of international law . . . .” 68 But they—and the rulebook conception that underlies
them—are not just descriptive accounts of CIL. They also provide the dominant framework for analyzing CIL. The ILC Conclusions are intended to
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 124 (Conclusion 2).
Id. at 125.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 130 (Conclusion 4).
Id. at 135 (Conclusion 8(1)).
Id. at 138 (Conclusion 9).
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123, 154; see also id. at 152, 154 (Conclusions 15, 16).
Id. at 125.
See Wood, First Report on CIL, supra note 30, at 7.
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guide lawyers who confront CIL in the practice of law. And their message is
that, before using, assessing, or making decisions on CIL, we must determine
whether the normative position at issue satisfies CIL’s secondary rules and
manifests as a primary rule. “All [a decisionmaker] needs to decide,” Maurice Mendelson has said, “is whether, at the moment the appreciation is being made, the practice has matured into a rule of law.” 69 If it has, it should
inform the substantive legal analysis. Otherwise, it should not.
Take the precautionary principle in international environmental law.
Depending on the context in which this principle arises, it either permits or
requires states to account for environmental risks when making regulatory
decisions. The principle already appears in multiple treaties. 70 If it also is
CIL, it has the potential to radiate beyond what the treaty texts indicate—to
cover more situations than the treaties do or to harden treaty language that is
not by itself binding. The claim that the precautionary principle has the status of a CIL rule has long been in circulation but remains contested. 71 For
the rulebook conception, that is the key question. Before using the precautionary principle as CIL, one must determine, as a threshold matter, whether
it satisfies the secondary rules and manifests as a primary rule.
B. Variations on a Theme
An enormous amount of energy has been devoted to answering that
threshold question—identifying the rules that belong in the CIL book. These
efforts vary in their details and results. But most of them rest on the rulebook
conception. They assume that CIL is a set of rules and that our main task as
international lawyers is to figure out what the rules are.
The ILC Conclusions are just one especially high-profile example. The
secondary rules that they articulate have been exhaustively debated. The debates center on the two-element test. Are both elements really necessary to
establish a CIL rule, or can one or the other element suffice? 72 When is a

69. Mendelson, supra note 39, at 176 (emphasis omitted).
70. E.g., Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312, 1316; Convention on Biological Diversity,
June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, 272–73; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1551.
71. International courts and tribunals have repeatedly avoided resolving the CIL status
of the precautionary principle. E.g., Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb.
1, 2011, 11 ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 135 (asserting that there was at least “a trend towards making [the
precautionary principle] part of customary international law”); Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶ 7.89, WTO
Docs. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (adopted Sept. 29, 2006) (“Since the legal
status of the precautionary principle remains unsettled . . . we consider that prudence suggests
that we not attempt to resolve this complex issue . . . .”).
72. Compare, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Customary International Law: A Reformulation, 4
INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1 (1998) (arguing that CIL can arise from a practice alone, without much
evidence of opinio juris), and Mendelson, supra note 39, at 250, 289 (same), with Guzman, su-
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treaty evidence of CIL? 73 How significant are verbal pronouncements that
contradict the material practice? 74 When, if ever, may a state opt out of a CIL
rule? 75 When do the actions of just a few states, combined with the persistent
silence of many others, establish a CIL rule? 76 And so on and so forth. These
questions make sense on their own terms only if one assumes the rulebook
conception. To be more precise, the questions presuppose that CIL consists
of a set of secondary and primary rules and that the secondary rules require
some combination of a practice and opinio juris to establish a primary rule.
Not everyone is committed to that particular formula for CIL. But
scholars who resist the two-element test usually still adhere to the rulebook
conception on some level. For example, Eyal Benvenisti has argued that the
ICJ may create CIL, even when the underlying practice and opinio juris are
insufficiently robust. 77 Benvenisti’s claim is that CIL has a secondary rule
that entitles the ICJ to “step in and impose” or “invent ‘customary law.’ ” 78
When the ICJ uses this secondary rule, he says, it produces a primary rule—a
coherent conduct norm that “all players” are likely to follow. 79 This account
is consistent with the rulebook conception because it defines CIL as a set of
secondary and primary rules. Its innovation is to say that CIL’s secondary
rules are not limited to the two-element test.
Given the many debates about the secondary rules, it’s not surprising
that the primary rules are often also contested. Indeed, even if everyone accepted the secondary rules as the ILC Conclusions articulate them, the primary rules would be hard to pin down. The practice and opinio juris on any
particular issue are bound to be eclectic and disjointed. Applying the twoelement test requires sifting through all the raw data on an issue, interpreting

pra note 11, at 153 (arguing that CIL can arise from only opinio juris, without a supporting
practice).
73. For the ILC’s view, see ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 143 (Conclusion
11).
74. For an overview of this debate, see Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757–
58 (2001).
75. For an overview, see JAMES A. GREEN, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR RULE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–6 (2016).
76. For the ILC’s view, see ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 133, 140 (Conclusions 6(1), 10).
77. Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a Judicial Tool for Promoting Efficiency, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 85, 86 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004) (“The ICJ has,
in fact, the authority to invent the custom.”).
78. Id. at 93; see also id. at 87 (“[T]his legislative function of international adjudicators is
itself grounded in customary international law.”).
79. Id. at 98 (“A judicial declaration of one equilibrium as the one that is binding as custom is likely to lead all players to modify their activities to conform to the judicially sanctioned
equilibrium.”).
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the ambiguities, and making judgments about inevitable inconsistencies. 80
Reasonable people routinely disagree about how to do that.
But they overwhelmingly agree that it must be done. Think of the 2005
study by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that purports
to identify 161 rules of customary international humanitarian law. 81 Or the
many efforts by the ILC to codify discrete substantive rules of CIL. 82 Or the
persistent debates about whether there is now a CIL rule that inflects the
U.N. Charter and permits individual states to use cross-border force to avert
humanitarian crises. 83 These projects all embrace the descriptive and analytic
precepts of the rulebook conception. They assume that CIL manifests as a set
of rules. And they take as their central mission the task of identifying the
rules.
C. The Discontents
The commitment to crystallizing the rules that belong in the CIL book
has a normative bent, as well. A persistent anxiety about CIL is that, despite
what orthodox accounts say, it is too elastic at any given moment to be like a
rulebook. 84 Critics of CIL have long argued that, because CIL is so malleable,

80. See, e.g., I.A. SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (11th ed. 1994) (“The difficulties involved in extracting a customary rule or principle of international law from the mass
of heterogeneous documentation of state practice . . . are not to be minimised . . . .”); Daniel
Bodansky, Does Custom Have a Source?, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 179, 179 (2015) (“Inducing the
rules of customary international law from state practice would be a Herculean task—a task, by
the way, more appropriate for an empirically oriented social scientist than for a lawyer.”).
81. IHL Database: Customary IHL, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS [hereinafter ICRC,
CIL Study], https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul [https://perma.cc
/PV2P-8Q3F].
82. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission, UNITED NATIONS, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/gfra.shtml [https://perma.cc/6Y4AQ57F] (listing the topics covered).
83. See Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS
232, 241–45 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003) (describing the dominant positions in this debate). Compare, e.g., Christine Gray, The Use of Force for Humanitarian Purposes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW: JUS AD
BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND JUS POST BELLUM 229, 253 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson
eds., 2013) (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to make a legal case for the existence of a right of
unilateral humanitarian intervention today.”), with Harold Hongju Koh, Address, The War
Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 1004 (2016) (arguing that such
interventions are sometimes lawful).
84. Some international lawyers argue that CIL’s flexibility is an asset because it allows
CIL to adapt to new circumstances or sensibilities. E.g., Jeremy Pearce, Customary International Law: Not Merely Fiction or Myth, 2003 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 125, 125, 128; Int’l Law Comm’n,
Summary Record of the 3148th Meeting, at 140, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3148 (2012) (comments
of Mr. Tladi). This position does not fully address the perceived problems with it. One might
take the view that CIL’s flexibility is a strength so long as CIL’s content can be determined at
any given moment but that it becomes a weakness when CIL is too amorphous to pin down in
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it is deficient as law—lacking in the legitimacy or the efficacy that we usually
demand of law. The normative logic of this critique is clear: we should try to
make CIL more rule-like, and insofar as we cannot, we should refrain from
putting much stock in it.
Attacks on the legitimacy of CIL center on its secondary rules. Critics
contend that the supposed secondary rules of CIL are not at all like rules.
They are so “indeterminate and manipulable” that they “cannot function as a
legitimate source of substantive legal norms.” 85 The reason why is that normative positions that derive from them are biased in favor of some actors—
typically the most powerful actors—at the expense of others; these positions
are “not, in fact, based on the implied consent or general acceptance of the
international community.” 86 Put differently, people who claim to apply the
secondary rules are really just using CIL as a pretext for foisting their own
“ ‘hegemonic’ ideas and beliefs” on unwitting subjects. 87
As an example, B.S. Chimni cites the obligation to afford fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors and investments. 88 This obligation is
codified in and central to most modern bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 89
The question for CIL is whether a comparable obligation exists outside of the
BITs. Does the fair and equitable treatment obligation operate only under
the BITs that prescribe it, or does it also appear in CIL? Chimni contends
that tribunals that address this question find that CIL is what they would like
it to be, disregarding substantial evidence to the contrary. In his words, “tribunals ‘have adapted the history of fair and equitable treatment to suit their
purpose’ ” and have “ ‘overstate[d] the protections afforded to investors un-

concrete cases. For the rare suggestion that it is a strength even in the latter scenario, see Mr.
Murase’s statement, id. at 137–38.
85. Kelly, supra note 10, at 451.
86. Id. at 452; see, e.g., Joyner, supra note 12, at 42 (calling this dynamic “very troubling”
and “counter to a fundamental principle . . . of the international legal system, i.e. that the
sources of international law are essentially based, even if imperfectly, upon the consent of
states to be bound to international legal obligation”); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 434 (1983) (describing the “danger of imposing more and more customary rules on more and more states, even against their clearly
expressed will”).
87. Chimni, supra note 12, at 7; see also Joyner, supra note 12, at 39 (“[A]ll of us—
international courts, the ILC, and academics—in fact use our corrupted methodologies for determining the presence of CIL in order to serve our own instrumentalist ends.”); Fernando R.
Tesón, Fake Custom, in REEXAMINING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 86, 103 (Brian D.
Lepard ed., 2017) (“[T]he problem is that [lawyers] disguise a value choice as an objective
norm, one that (they pretend) is not chosen by them as the best but is already enshrined in the
law.”).
88. Chimni, supra note 12, at 30–33.
89. See id. at 30; see also CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION ¶ 7.04 (2007) (explaining that the fair and equitable treatment obligation is often
“the outcome-decisive right, eclipsing even the more established protection against expropriation” in its importance).
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der customary international law.’ ” 90 The consequences can be significant.
An obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment “can now be smuggled
in as a CIL principle,” even when the relevant states have declined to adopt it
as a matter of treaty law. 91
Attacks on the efficacy of CIL also fixate on its variability, but they tend
to focus on CIL’s primary rules. These rules are said to be too plastic to
meaningfully regulate behavior. The worry is that states can easily manipulate the raw data—the evidence of a practice and opinio juris—to interpret
away or evade a putative primary rule at the point of application. That dynamic is exacerbated because no third-party arbiter has the authority to resolve, once and for all, what the primary rule on a given issue is or, in many
cases, how any such rule applies to specific facts. The events surrounding the
Jurisdictional Immunities decision might be an example. 92 If any state may at
any time ignore an existing CIL rule under the guise of trying to change the
rule, then the rule seems feckless.
Although scholars debate just how ineffective CIL is, they almost always
assume that its efficacy depends on its capacity to establish stable primary
rules. And many insist that its efficacy is impaired. 93 For instance, Karol
Wolfke has said that “the frequently expressed doubts about [CIL’s] present
usefulness . . . seem to be fully justified,” “[c]onsidering [its] complexity, imprecision, and relative slowness.” 94 Carlos Vásquez has asserted that CIL’s
elasticity presents “opportunities for evasion or contestation” that undercut

90. Chimni, supra note 12, at 31 (quoting Theodore Kill, Note, Don’t Cross the Streams:
Past and Present Overstatement of Customary International Law in Connection with Conventional Fair and Equitable Treatment Obligations, 106 MICH. L. REV. 853, 858, 867 (2008)).
91. Id. at 32.
92. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text; Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati,
Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can Customary International Law Be Improved?, 120
YALE L.J.F. 421, 421 (2011) (“[I]t has become increasingly apparent that CIL is structurally unable to address many of the world’s most pressing problems . . . .”); Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 563, 580 (2016) (arguing that custom is relevant in certain limited situations); George
Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541,
541–42, 543 (2005) (arguing that “there are circumstances where [CIL] may independently
affect the behavior of states,” “even if it only does so at the margins”); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 622 (2002) (asserting that “customary international law is
least likely to exist where it would be most helpful” because the “greater the potential benefits”
of establishing a rule, “the greater the incentive of individual states to defect, and the greater
the need for draconian enforcement mechanisms—mechanisms absent in the case of custom”).
But cf. Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 389, 401 (2014) (“[W]hile
the legal and institutional characteristics of CIL often impair reciprocity and retaliation, they
increase the precedential impact of defections. As a result, states may comply because they expect that their defection would undermine a cooperative norm whose continued existence they
value.”).
94. Wolfke, supra note 39, at 15.
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its efficacy. 95 Andrew Guzman agrees: “[T]he lack of precision in CIL rules
does indeed undermine the force of the rules and generate skepticism about
their importance.” 96
The usual response to these criticisms is, like the ILC’s, to double down
on the rulebook—to insist that CIL’s secondary rules limit its elasticity and
help establish stable primary rules. 97 As I explain below, this response is uncompelling. CIL does not actually conform to a rulebook. Thus, as long as
the rulebook conception is the metric for evaluating it, CIL will come up
short. But what if the rulebook conception is misinformed? What if the
problem lies not with CIL but with the conceptual apparatus that we have
been using to assess it?
III. A PRACTICE-ORIENTED ALTERNATIVE
It’s hard to overstate just how dissociated the rulebook conception is
from CIL’s day-to-day operation. As discussed, the process for CIL is extremely messy and produces a lot of disconnected raw data. In the rulebook
conception, this process can create CIL only if the output satisfies certain
secondary rules and manifests as primary rules. The ILC Conclusions say
that, for this to happen, the mix of practice and opinio juris must be sufficiently clear and consistent. Otherwise, the output cannot be CIL.
That depiction of CIL is inaccurate. It does not describe the normative
material that global actors in the ordinary course recognize and use as CIL.
This material neither derives from secondary rules nor manifests only as
primary rules. The reason why is that the disorderly process for CIL largely
determines what it is. 98 Because this process is so messy, the normative material that it produces does not come only, or even primarily, in the form of
rules. It often is contingent and variable. Put differently, although the CIL
process sometimes produces norms that have the clarity and stability of
rules, most of its normative output is more fragmentary—treated and accepted as CIL by some actors or in certain settings but not by or in others.
This material cannot be CIL under the rulebook conception. But it routinely
shapes how people understand and interact with CIL. It is in a very real sense
CIL.

95. Carlos M. Vásquez, Withdrawing from International Custom: Terrible Food, Small
Portions, 120 YALE L.J.F. 269, 286–87 (2011).
96. Guzman, supra note 11, at 124; see also Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer,
Customary International Law in the 21st Century, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 197,
207 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., 2008) (“A lack of clarity as to the content of
rules of CIL is likely to be a major factor in weakening [them].”).
97. See ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 122.
98. I have previously argued that the act of identifying CIL cannot meaningfully be dissociated from the process for creating it. See Monica Hakimi, Custom’s Method and Process:
Lessons from Humanitarian Law, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE, supra note 12, at 148. Here, I elaborate
on and discuss the implications of that claim.
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To be clear, I am here presenting an alternative account of CIL that describes what it is as a real-world sociological phenomenon. Let me address at
the outset one likely objection. Some will say that CIL, as I am describing it,
is too unmoored or inconstant to be law. A prominent family of jurisprudential theories posits that law is by definition rule-like—that in order for a social practice to constitute law, it must in key ways conform to a rulebook. 99
The objection would be that CIL must satisfy the rulebook conception in order to be law.
However, the jurisprudential theories that define law in rule-like terms
are not the only available ones; others are compatible with my account. 100
Moreover, the idea that all law must conform to the same universal criteria,
no matter its social context, is itself suspect. People in this world understand
law in all sorts of ways. My goal is not to resolve what law is in some universal sense but rather to describe a particular kind of law. If the material that
global actors routinely accept and treat as law does not satisfy a certain jurisprudential theory, the logical conclusion is not that the material is not law
but that the theory is incomplete; it is detached from and an inadequate barometer of what law “is” in the real world. After all, law is not just an abstract
theoretical proposition. It is a social phenomenon. To understand how CIL
functions as law, we need to move beyond those theories—as I do here.
A. The Practice of Customary International Law
CIL’s defining characteristics are not clarity or consistency but high levels of fluidity, uncertainty, and contestation. These characteristics are a function of the CIL process. Because this process is so unstructured, it lacks
mechanisms to regulate which normative positions are advanced through it
or how particular positions play out. Two important points follow. First, the
salience of a position within CIL—the extent to which the position is recognized and used as CIL—does not depend on whether it satisfies certain secondary rules. What matters instead is how the group of actors who
participate in a given domain of global governance interact with the position.

99. See, e.g., Wood, First Report on CIL, supra note 30, at 17 (“[A]s in any legal system,
there must in public international law be rules for identifying the sources of the law.”); Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 523, 524 (2013) (“At least since
H.L.A. Hart, . . . most legal theorists in the positivist tradition[] have accepted that the internalization of a rule of recognition, or, more precisely, the official internalization of the ultimate or
master rule of recognition[] is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
law.” (footnote omitted)).
100. The jurisprudential theory that is probably most on point is the New Haven School,
which I discuss infra in note 168. But one need not adopt that theory to accept that law need
not be like a rulebook. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL
CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 101–02 (1974) (conceiving of law “not [as] a set of fixed, selfdefining categories of permissible and prohibited conduct” but rather as a tool to “orient deliberation, order priorities, [and] guide within broad limits”); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”).
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Second, because global actors take different stances on the normative positions that are batted around in the CIL process, these positions do not consistently take the form of conduct rules. They are often inconstant.
1.

No Secondary Rules

CIL does not have secondary rules. 101 Although orthodox accounts insist
that it does, any serious effort to articulate the rules ends up exposing that
they are nothing like rules. The ILC Conclusions are illustrative. They purport to establish intelligible, generally applicable criteria—“clear guidance”—
“to ensure that a rule of customary international law is properly identified.” 102 But in fact, they do not.
Even the ILC’s commentary that accompanies the Conclusions recognizes that the criteria for identifying CIL are unstable. For example, Conclusion
8 posits that, in order to satisfy the two-element test, a practice “must be sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent.” 103 That sounds
like a rule. Yet the commentary then advises that what counts as sufficient
“does not lend itself to exact formulations, as circumstances may vary greatly
from one case to another.” 104 In some cases (the ILC does not tell us which
ones), the underlying support “may have to be widely exhibited,” while in
others (again, we don’t know which), support “may well be less.” 105 According to the ILC itself, the requisite level of support for a position is not fixed
or discernible in advance but fluid and highly contextually variable.
Likewise, the commentary asserts that the raw data that count as support
vary from one situation to the next. “[T]he type of evidence consulted . . .
depends on the circumstances, and certain forms of practice and certain
forms of evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) may be of particular
significance, according to the context.” 106 The ILC does not identify when
certain kinds of evidence are relevant or weighty. It just reminds us that “regard must be had to the particular circumstances in which any evidence is to
be found; only then may proper weight be accorded to it.” 107
Take the question of whether the many BITs with fair and equitable
treatment obligations evince a comparable obligation in CIL. Here is what

101. Other scholars have also emphasized this point. For example, Daniel Bodansky contends that, because “non-treaty rules emerge through a diffuse process of social interaction . . .
it would be a mistake to analyze [them] in terms of secondary rules.” Bodansky, supra note 80,
at 182. However, even Bodansky seems to adhere to the rulebook conception on some level. He
speaks of CIL as if it is just a collection of primary rules—both because he repeatedly refers to
CIL as “rules” and because he suggests that, however CIL emerges, it manifests as intelligible,
generally applicable conduct norms. Id.
102. ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 122, 123.
103. Id. at 135.
104. Id. at 136.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 127.
107. Id. at 128.
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the ILC’s commentary advises about using “the existence of similar provisions in a number of bilateral or other treaties” as evidence of CIL:
While it may indeed be the case that such repetition attests to the existence
of a corresponding rule of customary international law (or has given rise to
it), it “could equally show the contrary” in the sense that States enter into
treaties because of the absence of any rule or in order to derogate from an
existing but different rule of customary international law. 108

There is not a secondary rule here. The many BITs with fair and equitable
treatment obligations might be good evidence of a corresponding obligation
in CIL, but they “could equally show” the opposite—that no such obligation
exists. The ILC Conclusions do not give us any guidance for determining
which of these possibilities is correct.
Thus, despite what they purport to do, the ILC Conclusions do not actually articulate rules for identifying the normative positions that satisfy the
rulebook’s magic threshold and qualify as CIL. 109 This does not mean that
the Conclusions are wholly disconnected from the practice. They are not.
They rightly identify a range of discursive moves that global actors use to argue about and justify particular decisions in CIL. The moves just do not
function like secondary rules. They do not represent “clear” or generally applicable criteria that “ensure that a [primary] rule of customary international
law is properly identified.” 110
Moreover, global actors do not consistently use the discursive moves, as
they would secondary rules. They pick and choose among the various moves
or sometimes just ignore them. And to be clear, this variability in how global
actors argue about or justify particular positions in CIL is central to, not at
the periphery of, the practice. Global actors do not systematically apply the
same criteria for validating particular positions as CIL.
Most actors approach CIL not as detached observers assessing different
normative positions against certain preestablished criteria but as advocates
advancing their own preferences. Consider the ICRC study that purports to
find 161 rules of customary international humanitarian law. 111 The ICRC did

108. Id. at 146 (quoting Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment,
2007 I.C.J. 582, ¶ 90 (May 24)).
109. Others have also criticized the ILC Conclusions on these grounds. For example,
while the ILC was working on the Conclusions, a group of Asian and African legal experts contended that, “[i]n order to achieve the objective of the ILC project . . . to produce a practical,
user-friendly set of conclusions, further precision and more concrete criteria are necessary.”
See Sienho Yee, Report on the ILC Project on “Identification of Customary International Law,”
14 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 375, 381 (2015) (reproducing the report of the Informal Expert Group
on Customary International Law of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization). The
group’s diagnosis—that the ILC Conclusions do not establish meaningful criteria for identifying CIL—is correct. But its suggestion to make the ILC Conclusions more precise is misguided.
That suggestion presupposes that CIL conforms to a rulebook and has secondary rules that can
be articulated more precisely.
110. ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 121–22.
111. ICRC, CIL Study, supra note 81.
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not apply, at least not in any standard way, the two-element test that requires
a widespread practice and opinio juris. 112 Instead, it suggested that some positions can be CIL despite an extensive practice to the contrary and the absence of any opinio juris. In the ICRC’s words: “It appears that international
courts and tribunals on occasion conclude that a rule of customary international law exists when that rule is a desirable one . . . for the protection of the
human person, provided that there is no important contrary opinio juris.” 113
Some might want to minimize this language. They might contend that
the study’s positions on CIL still for the most part satisfied the two-element
test. If this is true, it would have to be a version of the two-element test that
is contingent and contestable, not one that applies across the board, as secondary rules would. In fact, whatever test the ICRC used was contested. And
it was contested in terms that are completely routine for CIL. Critics of the
ICRC study claimed that its normative positions lacked sufficient support in
state practice and opinio juris, that it wrongly diminished or exaggerated the
significance of certain data, that it failed to account for the contrary treaty
practice, and so on. 114 These moves are business as usual in CIL. They evince
what the ILC’s commentary to the Conclusions also implicitly concede: The
grounds that global actors use to assert that particular positions qualify as
CIL are not stable or fixed. They are malleable and contingent. They do not
operate like rules.
One might expect international courts and tribunals to be more disciplined by the rulebook conception. These institutions are charged with identifying and applying, not making, CIL. The ILC explains that they are
particularly well suited to conducting the “structured and careful process of
legal analysis and evaluation” that the rulebook requires. 115 However, several
studies show that adjudicative institutions do not consistently apply any sec-

112.
113.

See Hakimi, supra note 98, at 169–70.
1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, at xlviii (2005), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets
/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLU3
-ZGZX].
114. E.g., George H Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law—An Interpretation on Behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 507
(2005); John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443 (2007); Daniel Bethlehem, The Methodological Framework of the
Study, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 10 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007); Yoram Dinstein,
The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1 (2006).
For examples of the ICRC’s responses to these criticisms, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to US Comments, 89 INT’L REV. RED. CROSS
473 (2007), and Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law—A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525 (2005).
115. ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 122.
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ondary rules for CIL. 116 They generally do not harness the raw data to show
that their CIL positions have enough support to satisfy the two-element
test. 117 And they periodically identify as CIL positions that have only thin
support or remain quite controversial. 118
Take an example that postdates the ILC Conclusions. In 2019, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court decided that, under both
the Rome Statute and CIL, heads of state are not immune from arrest by other states when executing a warrant that an international court has issued. 119
The Appeals Chamber did not show that this position on immunity has
widespread support in the practice and opinio juris. And in fact, it does not.
The opposition to it is both substantial and undeniable. 120 Thus, rather than
amass the raw data to justify the position, the Appeals Chamber simply announced that it need not carry that burden: “[T]he onus is on those who
claim that there is such immunity in relation to international courts to estab-

116. The evidence suggests that prominent international courts and tribunals not only
ignore the two-element test but also decline to constrain themselves with any other secondary
rules. See, e.g., BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 31, at 279; Ilias Bantekas, Reflections on Some
Sources and Methods of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
121, 121 (2006); Stefan Talmon, Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology Between Induction, Deduction and Assertion, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 417 (2015).
117. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do
Courts Do It?, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE, supra note 12, at 117, 146–47; Rudolf H Geiger, Customary International Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice: A Critical Appraisal, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE
BRUNO SIMMA 673, 692 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011); see also Ryan M. Scoville, Finding
Customary International Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1893, 1935 (2016) (conducting a quantitative
study that concludes that U.S. “federal courts have not followed the traditional doctrine” for
identifying CIL).
118. See, e.g., DARCY, supra note 35, at 80; Benvenisti, supra note 77, at 86; Tams, supra
note 35, at 379.
119. Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Judgment in the Jordan
Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, paras. 2, 114, 117 (May 6, 2019).
120. See, e.g., id. at para. 53 (explaining Jordan’s position that, “[u]nder customary international law, Head of State immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction is not subject to any
exceptions”); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-367, The League of Arab States’ Observations, para. 26 (July 16, 2018) (arguing for head of state immunity in this case); Prosecutor v.
Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-370, The African Union’s Submission, at 6 (July 13, 2018) (same);
see also, e.g., Dapo Akande, ICC Appeals Chamber Holds that Heads of State Have No Immunity Under Customary International Law Before International Tribunals, EJIL: TALK! (May 6,
2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-appeals-chamber-holds-that-heads-of-state-have-no-im
munity-under-customary-international-law-before-international-tribunals/
[https://perma
.cc/G2SD-B5NB] (describing the no-immunity position as “extremely controversial”); Dov
Jacobs, You Have Just Entered Narnia: ICC Appeals Chamber Adopts the Worst Possible Solution on Immunities in the Bashir Case, SPREADING JAM (May 6, 2019),
https://dovjacobs.com/2019/05/06/you-have-just-entered-narnia-icc-appeals-chamber-adoptsthe-worst-possible-solution-on-immunities-in-the-bashir-case/
[https://perma.cc/YKY8RBV4] (calling the no-immunity position “ridiculous”). But cf. Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC02/05-01/09-359, Written Observations of Professor Claus Kress as Amicus Curiae, para. 8
(June 18, 2018) (arguing that the Appeals Chamber should adopt the no-immunity position,
even though it “is admittedly not (yet) firmly entrenched and fortified”).
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lish sufficient State practice and opinio juris.” 121 In making this decision, the
Appeals Chamber did not apply the two-element test or any other secondary
rule. It did its own thing.
Of course, courts and tribunals have techniques for constraining their
own discretion on CIL or otherwise limiting the normative positions that
they recognize as CIL. These techniques do not function as secondary rules
because they do not apply in all situations in which CIL is at issue; they are
confined to the particular cases or institutions that use them. For instance,
the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a normative position is cognizable as CIL under the Alien Tort Statute only if it is “accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms we have recognized.” 122 Although this standard applies in Alien Tort cases in U.S. court, it is not a secondary rule for CIL. Positions that do not satisfy it are routinely accepted and treated as CIL in other
venues and for other purposes. Likewise, an international court could choose
to require substantial evidence of a practice and opinio juris before adopting
a position as CIL. For the requirement to operate as a secondary rule, global
actors would have to apply it in the many other contexts in which they engage with CIL. That eventuality has not yet come to pass. Despite all the efforts to define the secondary rules of CIL, it still does not have any.
2.

Variable Conduct Norms

The lack of secondary rules in CIL does not mean that “anything goes.”
It means that what goes is not determined by secondary rules. The status of a
given normative position within CIL depends instead on how global actors
interact with it over time. 123 To what extent do these actors invoke, regard,
and use the position as CIL, rather than ignore or challenge it? Thus, as a
practical matter, those who want a position to have traction as CIL must find
support for it. They must earn authority for the position from other participants in the CIL process.
Insofar as global actors broadly accept and treat a position as CIL, it becomes entrenched. At some point, it might even garner enough support to
operate like a conduct rule. A well-known example involves the continental
shelf. 124 In 1945, the United States announced that it had exclusive jurisdic-

121. Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Judgment in the Jordan
Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, para. 116 (May 6, 2019).
122. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
123. On the point that an international legal practice is necessarily interactional, see
JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010).
124. On this example, see MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 107–22 (2013);
ZDENEK J. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 32 (1968).
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tion over the resources in its continental shelf. 125 Other coastal states followed the United States’ lead by advancing similar claims. These states then
codified their common positions in a 1958 treaty. 126 And in 1969, the ICJ
pronounced that the positions reflected “received or at least emergent rules
of customary international law.” 127
The rights of coastal states to explore and exploit the continental shelf
solidified as rules because they attained such broad support. They will remain entrenched so long as that support continues. Although competing
claims on the continental shelf might still be advanced through the CIL process, these claims can easily be dismissed. The reason why has nothing to do
with any secondary rules. It is because support for the existing rules is sufficiently robust to prevent the opposition from resonating or gaining legal
traction.
Because global actors do not act as a coordinated bloc, the support that
they display for different normative positions is not uniform or stable. It varies. Many normative positions that are presented in the CIL process are neither collectively endorsed, like the ones on the continental shelf, nor
summarily rejected. They remain in circulation for extended periods with
only tepid or contingent support and real competition. These positions have
enough support to function as CIL in some settings but not enough support
to manifest as rules. Their legal salience is splintered and contingent, rather
than consistent or fixed. But in the settings in which they are legally salient,
they have the look, feel, and effect of CIL. In these settings, they for all intents and purposes are CIL.
The rulebook denies that such positions can be CIL, but it implicitly
recognizes their legal significance. If a position must have broad support in
the practice and opinio juris to satisfy the two-element test and qualify as
CIL, then it must gather quite a bit of steam before then. Before it operates as
a rule, it must be treated and accepted as law by some actors and in certain
respects but not by or in others. International lawyers sometimes try to capture this reality by sayings things like, “x is emerging as CIL,” or “there is a
trend toward x becoming CIL.” These statements themselves reveal the inadequacy of describing CIL as a set of rules. No matter whether x is gaining
traction and on the way to becoming a rule, it is at the moment not one. It is

125. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and
Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 1, 1945).
This claim was not entirely new; other states had previously asserted jurisdiction over resources in the seabed and subsoil beyond their territorial seas. Nevertheless, the U.S. claim in
1945 “gave birth to the modern concept of the continental shelf.” SUZETTE V. SUAREZ, THE
OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THEIR ESTABLISHMENT 25
(2008).
126. See Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 312.
127. North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den.; Fed Republic of
Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 39 (Feb. 20); see also H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine
Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 376, 377 (1950) (asserting that the position was “instant custom”).
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fragmentary and might never turn into a rule. And yet, it still might have
some force as CIL.
Adherents to the rulebook might say that we should reserve the label
“CIL” exclusively for normative positions that have become entrenched like
rules. Positions that are more mercurial or contingent might be called something else—if not “emergent CIL,” maybe “soft law.” 128 The different labels
presumably would be intended to mean something. They would signify that
normative positions that do not function like rules are not really CIL and
cannot accurately be characterized as such. But why not? If the goal is to describe the normative material that is produced through the CIL process and
that global actors in the ordinary course regard and use as they do CIL, then
non-rule-like positions must be included. These positions routinely have
force as CIL. To call them something else just because they do not operate as
rules is weirdly tautological: “Non-rule-like positions cannot be CIL because
they are not rules.” It also is misleading. It obscures important parts of the
practice of CIL.
Take a question that lies at the heart of international humanitarian law
(IHL): Who may be targeted for attack in wartime? The answer in interstate
conflicts is relatively straightforward and rests on the fundamental distinction between combatants and civilians. Members of state armed forces generally qualify as combatants, wear uniforms or other identifying insignia,
and are targetable unless they are hors de combat. 129 By contrast, civilians are
not targetable unless they directly participate in hostilities. 130 In many conflicts involving armed nonstate groups, the distinction between combatants
and civilians—and the targeting rules that depend on it—is blurred. 131
Members of these groups often blend in with the general population, rather
than identify themselves as such. 132 Moreover, membership itself can be

128. I discuss the limits of the term “soft law” in more detail infra in note 164.
129. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 43–44, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4, 23–
24 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320–22, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138–40; Rule 3.
Definition of Combatants, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org
/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule3 [https://perma.cc/FA46-Z3EE].
130. Additional Protocol I, supra note 129, at art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26–27.
131. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law:
A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 190 (2005) (“[I]n non-international armed conflicts practice is ambiguous as to whether . . . members of armed opposition groups are considered members of
armed forces or civilians.”).
132. See, e.g., Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of
the Law’: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 233,
269 (2003) (“This militarization of the civilian population is, indeed, a characteristic feature of
non-international conflicts . . . render[ing] it ever harder to distinguish between civilians and
combatants.”); Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 45, 53 (2010) (ob-
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more fluid. Loosely organized armed groups consist of people who participate in different capacities or to varying degrees over time. 133
In 2009, the ICRC released a document—the Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities—that aimed to clarify the targeting norms that apply, mostly as a matter of CIL, in conflicts against nonstate groups. 134 The positions that the ICRC adopted in the Interpretive
Guidance were controversial 135 and incompatible with the known views of a
number of militarily active states. 136 Thus, the ICRC did not contend that its
positions satisfied the secondary rules of CIL or had the status of primary
rules. It said only that they “reflect the ICRC’s institutional position[s] as to
how existing IHL should be interpreted.” 137
Yet because of the ICRC’s standing in IHL, its institutional positions are
legally salient. The positions that it took in the Interpretive Guidance are not
always treated as CIL, but they sometimes are, and even when they are not,
they are “the main reference point for any discussion of the subject.” 138 Of
course, the ICRC itself invokes these positions as the best iterations of CIL
when it discusses or tries to educate people on IHL. 139 Some national prose-

serving that “[n]ew warfare” is “characterized by fighting in highly populated areas with a blurring of the lines between military forces and civilian persons and objects”).
133. See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 33 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE] (“[T]here may
be various degrees of affiliation with such groups that do not necessarily amount to ‘membership’ within the meaning of IHL.”).
134. Id. at 9–10.
135. See Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time as”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741 (2010); W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 5
(2010); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641 (2010).
136. Compare, e.g., ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 133, at 16 (Recommendation II) (“[O]rganized armed groups . . . consist only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities . . . .”), with U.S. WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND
RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 19, 29 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. WHITE HOUSE,
REPORT ON LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS] (asserting that “[s]tates may target specific,
identified individual members of an enemy force” and defining membership in terms that are
broader than whether someone consistently takes a direct part in hostilities); compare, e.g.,
ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 133, at 70 (“The ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection is an integral part, not a malfunction, of IHL.”), with Boothby, supra note 135, at 758–
66 (discussing U.S., Canadian, and Israeli positions to the contrary).
137. ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 133, at 9.
138. Yahli Shereshevsky, Back in the Game: International Humanitarian Lawmaking by
States, 37 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (2019).
139. On the ICRC’s work, see Steven R. Ratner, Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The
Red Cross, Persuasion, and the Laws of War, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 459 (2011).
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cutors, militaries, and courts have also treated the positions as CIL. 140 For
example, prosecutors in Germany have invoked the Interpretive Guidance to
justify terminating criminal investigations into attacks on people who,
though not at the time participating in hostilities, regularly fought for armed
nonstate groups. 141 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Israel cited the Interpretive Guidance in 2018 to explain why attacking demonstrators near the security barrier with Gaza could be consistent with IHL. 142 In these cases, the
positions that the ICRC articulated in the Interpretive Guidance have CIL effect. To insist that they cannot be CIL, just because they do not operate as
rules, is to obscure the various ways in which they are actually used and received as CIL in the practice of law.
The precautionary principle is another example. The principle does not
function as a CIL rule because global actors take very different positions on
what it entails and whether and how it applies in discrete settings. 143 But any
suggestion that it is not part of CIL—that there is only, as the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea said in 2011, “a trend towards making [it]
part of customary international law”—is misleading. 144 For decades, states
have used the principle beyond what treaty law indicates to make, justify, or
challenge particular governance decisions. 145 These states have treated the
principle as CIL, if not across the board, as they would a rule, more circumstantially.
International adjudicative institutions have occasionally done the same.
These institutions have repeatedly declined to clarify the precautionary prin-

140. See Ka Lok Yip, The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: Sociological and Democratic Legitimacy in Domestic Legal Orders, 8
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 224, 226–32 (2017) (reviewing some practice).
141. Id. at 226–27 (discussing cases).
142. HCJ 3003/18 Yesh Din–Volunteers for Human Rights v. Chief of General Staff, IDF
(May 24, 2018) (Isr.), ¶ 45, https://supreme.court.gov.il.
143. See Daniel Bodansky, Deconstructing the Precautionary Principle, in BRINGING NEW
LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 381, 391 (David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 2004) (“[T]he
various formulations of the precautionary principle . . . differ along virtually every important
dimension: the legal status and function of the precautionary principle; the circumstances that
trigger its application; [and] the nature of a precautionary response . . . .”); David L.
VanderZwaag, The ICJ, ITLOS and the Precautionary Approach: Paltry Progressions, Jurisprudential Jousting, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 617, 617 (2013) (asserting that the principle is “wellknown for the confusion surrounding its interpretation and practical implications”).
144. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS Rep.
10, ¶ 135.
145. E.g., Memorial of Argentina, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2007
I.C.J. ¶¶ 5.13–5.19 (Jan. 15); Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1994 I.C.J. ¶¶ 6.63–6.69 (May 2); Appellate Body Report, European
Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 121, WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter WTO Appellate Body,
Beef Hormones] (“The basic submission of the European Communities is that the precautionary principle is, or has become, ‘a general customary rule of international law’ . . . .”).
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ciple’s CIL status, 146 but they have in discrete settings applied the principle as
CIL—in ways that radiate beyond the specific texts in which it appears. 147
For example, in the 1998 Beef Hormones case, the Appellate Body of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) determined that it was “unnecessary, and
probably imprudent” to opine on the principle’s status in CIL. 148 The Appellate Body further noted that the principle was not codified in the WTO
agreement at issue. 149 However, the Appellate Body then said that the principle “finds reflection” in, and in certain circumstances may inform, what
states do under that agreement. 150 The Appellate Body effectively used the
precautionary principle as CIL. It licensed states to restrict trade consistently
with the precautionary principle, even though the text of the WTO agreement did not provide for that result.
The ICJ’s 2010 Pulp Mills judgment is similar. Like the Appellate Body
in Beef Hormones, the ICJ in Pulp Mills declined to resolve the CIL status of
the precautionary principle. 151 Nevertheless, the ICJ noted that “a precautionary approach may be relevant in the interpretation and application of
the” bilateral treaty at issue. 152 It then determined that the treaty obligation
to protect and preserve [the aquatic environment] . . . has to be interpreted
in accordance with [what] . . . may now be considered a requirement under
general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a
shared resource. 153

Here, the ICJ used the precautionary principle as “general international law”
to define the treaty obligation at issue. It gave the principle CIL force.
Where does this leave us? In the everyday practice of international law,
CIL looks nothing like the rulebook conception. It does not derive from in-

146. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
147. See Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan; N.Z. intervening), Judgment, 2014
I.C.J. 226, 453, ¶ 9 (Mar. 31) (separate opinion by Charlesworth, J.) (“These observations suggest that treaties dealing with the environment should be interpreted wherever possible in light
of the precautionary approach . . . .”); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 100 (Apr. 20) (dissenting opinion by Vinuesa, J.) (describing the precautionary principle as “general international law”); Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl.
v. Japan), Case Nos. 3 & 4, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 280, ¶¶ 79–80 (interpreting a
treaty obligation to cooperate on maritime conservation to mean “that measures should be taken . . . to avert further deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna stock,” notwithstanding the
“scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to conserve the stock of southern bluefin
tuna”).
148. WTO Appellate Body, Beef Hormones, supra note 145, ¶ 123.
149. Id. ¶ 124.
150. Id.
151. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 13,
¶¶ 160–64 (Apr. 20).
152. Id. ¶ 164.
153. Id. ¶¶ 61, 204.
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telligible and generally applicable secondary rules. It emerges more organically, through an unstructured process in which the participants apply variable criteria to justify their normative positions in CIL. These disjointed
interactions define the content of CIL. While they sometimes are sufficiently
stable to generate conduct norms that operate like rules, they often are not.
Much of CIL’s content is inconstant and contingent, not fixed or generalizable, as rules would be.
B. The Law in Customary International Law
CIL is not the only kind of law that lacks secondary rules and manifests
in variable conduct norms. The common law is similarly “untethered.” 154
Digging into the analogy is instructive because it helps explain how CIL can
be recognizable as law, without conforming to the rulebook. After all, the
common law plainly is law and does not so conform.
The common law is, as Frederick Schauer says, an inherently “contingent and non-canonical” kind of law. 155 Its content does not derive from secondary rules because judges may create or change it as they see fit. The
common law is “subject to modification . . . when it appears to the common
law judge that application of what was previously thought to be the rule
would be silly, or inconsistent with good policy, or inconsistent with the justifications for having that rule.” 156 And common law judges do not just tinker around the edges. They sometimes discard what had been a conduct rule
and replace it with a normative position that is altogether different—not
necessarily with another rule. Many common law decisions reflect all-thingsconsidered assessments that turn heavily on the facts of the case and the
judge who happens to be deciding it. 157 The content of the common law thus
can be highly variable; it does not always come in the form of rules.

154. Lea Brilmayer, Untethered Norms After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: Positivism,
International Law, and the Return of the “Brooding Omnipresence,” 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
725, 727 (2013). This analogy is not new, but most scholars who focus on it address the role of
courts in developing or applying each kind of law. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE, supra note 12, at
34, 34 (“The application of CIL by an international adjudicator . . . is best understood in terms
similar to the judicial development of the common law . . . .”); Louis Henkin, International Law
as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561 (1984) (arguing that although “customary international law has often been characterized as ‘federal common law,’ ” the analogy is
misleading, in large part because CIL “is not made and developed by the federal courts independently and in the exercise of their own law-making judgment”). Scholars commonly also
use the analogy in passing. E.g., Anthony D’Amato, International Law, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 423, 424 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2002); Guzman, supra
note 11, at 120, 124.
155. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 178 (1991).
156. Id. at 175.
157. Id. at 176 (discussing the canonical cases of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111
N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)).
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Some might intuit that common law doctrines on precedent and stare
decisis function like secondary rules that help establish stable conduct rules.
But Brian Simpson has persuasively rebutted that logic. As an initial matter,
he explains, these doctrines are relatively recent innovations, not inherent in
or historically part of the common law. The common law existed for centuries as a kind of law before the idea emerged that “there could be binding
precedents” or even that precedents had “status as authorities.” 158 More to
the point: common law precedents do not operate like secondary rules. They
do not establish discernible, generally applicable criteria for validating particular normative positions as law. A precedent’s authority in future cases is
not stable or fixed but variable, uncertain, and contestable. “It is as if,” Simpson has said, “the system placed particular value upon dissension, obscurity,
and the tentative character of judicial utterances.” 159
In the absence of secondary rules, the stickiness of a normative position—the extent to which it is stable, like a rule, or more transitory—
depends on how it is used by the group of actors who participate in creating
and applying it. As Simpson explained, “common law rules enjoy whatever
status they possess . . . because of their continued reception.” 160 “[T]he relative value of formulated propositions of the common law depends upon the
degree to which such propositions are accepted as accurate statements of received ideas or practice, and . . . the degree to which practice is consistent
with them.” 161 That sounds an awful lot like CIL.
The main difference between the two kinds of law is that the common
law is centered around courts. Courts generally are available to apply the
common law in concrete cases and play an outsized role in determining its
content. Although courts also participate in the creation and application of
CIL, they are less prominent here. A broader range of actors exert control
over CIL’s content. As such, the authority of particular normative positions
within CIL is even more diffuse and elusive than it is in the common law.
CIL’s authoritative content is harder to pin down.
The analogy offers three lessons for CIL. First, a normative position can
be highly contingent and transitory but still law. A common law decision
creates law, even when it does not express its content as a conduct rule. The
decision establishes the law of the case, no matter whether other judges decide to follow it in subsequent cases. It is the law in the jurisdiction in which
it is decided, even if another court in a different jurisdiction declines to give
it res judicata effect and comes out the other way. The same goes for CIL.
The precautionary principle is CIL in Pulp Mills, even though its generaliza-

158. A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON
LAW 359 (1987).
159. Id. at 372.
160. Id. at 367–68.
161. Id. at 377; see also SCHAUER, supra note 155, at 180–81 (explaining that “commonlaw rules become encrusted over time” through understandings, established in cases and the
professional discourse, “that tend to give those rules presumptive albeit not conclusive force”).
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bility to other contexts is unclear. 162 It is the CIL of the case, no matter
whether other actors follow it in future cases.
Second, because of this “contingent and non-canonical” character, 163 the
authority of different normative positions within CIL is not binary or constant. 164 It is variable. Some normative positions (e.g., the prohibition of genocide) are more authoritative and sticky than are others (e.g., the ICRC’s
positions in the Interpretive Guidance). Moreover, the authority of any particular position can be challenged in real time. Although preexisting expectations usually inflect how a position is used and received, its authority can still
be contested as a case plays out and then diminished or reconstituted depending on what happens.
This is true even of positions that fall toward the rule end of a spectrum.
For example, recall that the ICJ decided in Jurisdictional Immunities that CIL
entitles foreign states to immunity from national jurisdiction in cases involving wartime atrocities. 165 Although the ICJ’s position on foreign state immunity is highly authoritative, it was contestable enough for the Italian judijudiciary to depart from it. Now, the CIL on foreign state immunity in Italy
consists not of one position (immunity) or the other (no immunity) but of
both simultaneously. Each position has some authority in Italy, but this authority is contingent, rather than absolute. Italy’s foreign ministry might reasonably treat the ICJ position as authoritative on the world stage, even as
Italian claimants suing Germany in Italian court do not.
Third, the contingent character of these two kinds of law affects the job
of lawyering. Because authority is not binary or stable, the key questions for
legal practitioners are not whether a particular normative position is law but
to what degree, in what settings, and for whom does it have some legal effect. 166 These questions cannot be answered with legal methods that are de-

162. See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text.
163. SCHAUER, supra note 155, at 178.
164. The concept of soft law has been used to make a similar point: the authority that
attaches to different legal norms operates along a soft–hard spectrum. Authority thus can be
varying degrees of soft or hard; it need not fall on the hard side of the spectrum to be law. See
W. Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics, in 1
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS 135, 136 (Emmanuel G. Bello & Bola A.
Ajibola eds., 1992); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421 (2000). For an excellent overview of the literature on soft
law, see Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements,
and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 712–17 (2010).
165. Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
166. See W. Michael Reisman, The Democratization of Contemporary International LawMaking Processes and the Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 15, 28–29 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds.,
2005) (“Because the question of whether international law will be effective in a particular dispute will increasingly depend upon the arena or forum in which the dispute is heard, scholarly
and practitioner statements of what the law is . . . will increasingly have to be qualified by reference to where a potential dispute in the future may be initially characterized in terms of law
and where those characterizations will thereafter be put to political use.”).
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signed for a rulebook. In other words, the law’s content cannot be determined by applying any secondary rules (there are none to apply) or assuming that that content will be in one context what it was in another (it might
not be). The legal analysis requires more craft and expertise than the
straightforward application of preestablished rules. Identifying whether a
particular normative position is likely to have CIL force requires one to examine the relevant precedents, identify the propositions for which they
stand, and assess their salience in the varied settings in which they might be
invoked. “[L]ife might be much simpler,” Simpson said, “if the common law
consisted of a code of rules, identifiable by reference to source rules, but the
reality of the matter is that it is all much more chaotic than that.” 167 The
same is true of CIL.
Where the law has, if only for the time being, stabilized, expectations
about its content can be gleaned from established patterns of behavior. Analysts can do reasonably well (though not perfectly) at anticipating how particular positions will play out—to what extent or in what settings the
positions will resonate as law. Such predictions become less reliable when the
law is highly inconstant and contentious. This is where the contrast between
the common law and CIL is most relevant. Because CIL’s content cannot be
settled by any one actor, it more often remains splintered. Competing positions on the law can stay in circulation for extended periods, each with some
authority but none with sufficient authority to stamp out the others. As discussed, this can also happen in the common law. The difference is that, in
CIL, it happens not just across cases but also in a single case. Again, it does
not follow that the competing positions are not law. It just means that they
are a kind of law that does not operate like a rulebook. 168

167. SIMPSON, supra note 158, at 368; cf. D’ASPREMONT, supra note 10, at 164
(“[S]ubjecting customary international law to a purely formal identification process would run
contra to its raison d’être and would deprive it of its distinctive character.”).
168. For those who want a more extensive account of how this material can be law, even
though it is splintered and contested, the New Haven School of jurisprudence is instructive.
This School defines law as that which is controlling (materially relevant) and authoritative
(normatively relevant). More precisely, a policy position is law insofar as people expect the position to be implemented and perceive it to be authoritative. See W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, Address at the American Society of
International Law Annual Meeting, in AMERICAN SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ANNUAL MEETING 101 (1981) [hereinafter Reisman, International Lawmaking]; see also
JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS
211, 296, 300, 301 (1994) (positing that law both claims “legitimate authority” and possesses
the ability to “impos[e] its will on many over whom it claims authority”). These two attributes
of law are similar to the rulebook’s elements of a practice and opinio juris. But whereas the
rulebook requires consistency in the elements to create law, the New Haven School does not. It
recognizes that policies vary in the extent to which they are controlling and authoritative, and
that this variance makes law itself more splintered than any rulebook would be. Michael Reisman has explained that a policy position can be law, even if its normative content is extremely
contingent or hard to pin down; even if it is case-specific, rather than generally applicable; and
even if it is accepted and treated as law only among a subset of potential participants. See W.
Michael Reisman, The Quest for World Order and Human Dignity in the Twenty-First Century:

1520

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:1487

IV. METHODS OF LEGAL ANALYSIS
I have thus far advanced a descriptive claim that counters the rulebook
conception and the many accounts of CIL that reflect it. CIL is not like a
rulebook. It does not consist of a set of secondary and primary rules. It
emerges more enigmatically and its content is more elastic than the rulebook
conception imagines. Why does this matter? One might intuit that, even if
the rulebook conception is too simplistic, it still captures something real
about CIL. Some CIL norms do operate like primary rules and can be said to
satisfy a version of the rulebook’s secondary rules. So, what’s at stake in
whether we continue to think about and describe CIL as a rulebook, or we
discard that conception and acknowledge that CIL is a messy, variable type
of law?
The short answer is that, in purporting to describe CIL, the rulebook
conception also structures how most international lawyers assess it—the
kinds of questions they ask about it and the analytic methods that they bring
to bear on it. This is not just happenstance. Recall that the ILC Conclusions
are intended “to offer practical guidance” to those who come across CIL in
the practice of law. 169 The guidance that they offer is delusory. Given that
CIL does not actually operate like a rulebook, analyzing it as if it does is misguided.
This is so for two reasons. First, lawyers who believe that CIL has a set of
secondary rules reasonably spend time trying to figure out what the rules are
and how they apply in concrete cases. 170 The fact that CIL does not derive
from secondary rules means that this exercise is futile. The rulebook conception distracts or misguides analysts by instructing them to look for and faithfully apply secondary rules that do not exist.
As discussed, CIL’s content is determined not by any secondary rules
but by how different normative positions are used and received in concrete
settings. Lawyers who want to identify that content might examine the same
raw data that are relevant for the rulebook—the various claims and counterclaims on an issue, as expressed in the operational practice, judicial deciConstitutive Process and Individual Commitment, 351 RECUEIL DES COURS 15, 131–32 (2010)
[hereinafter Reisman, Quest for World Order and Human Dignity]; Reisman, supra note 166, at
136; Reisman, International Lawmaking, supra at 112. To be clear, the New Haven School defines law more capaciously than the rulebook does, but its definition is not completely openended. It emphasizes that the distinguishing features of law are an authority signal that is lacking in mere policy preferences and a control signal that is not evident for mere aspirations. See
Reisman, International Lawmaking, supra at 108–10. This definition of law is sometimes difficult to apply; we cannot always be sure whether or to what extent a particular claim reflects the
law. But as discussed supra in Sections II.A and II.B, the same is true of the rulebook’s definition.
169. ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 122; see also Michael Wood, Editorial
Comment, The Present Position Within the ILC on the Topic of “Identification of Customary
International Law”: In Partial Response to Sienho Yee, Report on the ILC Project on “Identification of Customary International Law,” 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 3, 6 (2016) (“Members of the
Commission agree that the outcome . . . should be of an essentially practical nature.”).
170. See, e.g., supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
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sions, verbal pronouncements, and so on. But the question to ask when examining these data is not whether they satisfy some variant of the twoelement test. The question is, what do the data reveal about a position’s legal
salience? To what extent and in what circumstances is the position likely to
be regarded as CIL? This question might at times lead to similar results as
the rulebook, but it often does not, and even when it does, the analysis is different.
Second, because the rulebook conception directs lawyers to the twoelement test, it distorts how they assess different normative positions within
CIL. It directs them to ask only whether a position has ripened into a conduct rule, and it instructs them not to factor into their calculus positions that
have not. However, positions that do not manifest as conduct rules routinely
have legal traction. International lawyers and policymakers need to pay attention to these positions. They need to assess not (or not only) whether a
position is a rule but to what extent, in what ways, and for whom it is legally
salient. How will the position be advanced and received, and how should
they themselves interact with it?
Take the example on the continental shelf. In the early 1950s, when the
positions of coastal states were gaining traction but had not yet solidified as
rules, any lawyer worth her salt would analyze them as part of CIL. These
positions already had the look, feel, and effect of CIL, not across the board,
as rules would, but by some actors in some settings. Advising a client that the
positions were not CIL—that they were just politics or “fake custom” 171—
would be deeply misleading, bordering on malpractice. The client would understandably be confused by the considerable support for these positions. He
would confront legal problems if he started exploiting a continental shelf
without first obtaining permission from the states that had already made it
their own. And he would be derelict if he himself were a state official who
did nothing as his coastal neighbors asserted jurisdiction over parts of the
continental shelf that his government could also reasonably claim. In each of
these scenarios, the client would have good reason to complain: “You told
me that these positions are not legally cognizable; why do people talk and act
as if they are?” The fact that they had not satisfied the rulebook’s threshold
would have been almost entirely irrelevant to understanding or engaging
with the then-existing law on the continental shelf.
The point is not limited to situations in which a normative position is on
the verge of becoming a rule. Consider the current contest about when, if ever, states may use cross-border force to defend against attacks by nonstate
actors. 172 Several states contend that such force is lawful if an attack ema171. Tesón, supra note 87.
172. I have discussed this contest in more detail elsewhere. Monica Hakimi, Defensive
Force Against Non-State Actors: The State of Play, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Hakimi, Defensive Force]; Monica Hakimi, The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory Form, 112 AM. J. INT’L
L. 151, 180–190 (2018) [hereinafter Hakimi, The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory Form]; Monica
Hakimi & Jacob Katz Cogan, The Two Codes on the Use of Force, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 257, 27883
(2016).
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nates from a state that is unable or unwilling to contain the threat. 173 Moreover, when states invoke this position, the blowback under the jus ad bellum—
which is defined by both the U.N. Charter and CIL—is often imperceptible. 174
However, authority for the unable-or-unwilling position is still fragmentary and contingent. The position has more authority in some circles and for
some operations than it does in or for others. The states that themselves use
the position treat it as law in their domestic settings and their interactions
with one another. 175 But outside of those arenas, the position’s authority is
demonstrably weaker. Most states have indicated that, although they tolerate
or support discrete operations that might be compatible with the position,
they are unprepared to endorse it as a generally applicable rule of CIL. 176
Brazil and France each recently advanced a competing position: that defensive force against nonstate actors is never or almost never lawful. 177
The question under the rulebook is which of the available positions on
self-defense is the rule of CIL and, by extension, the U.N. Charter. That
question has received enormous attention over the past two decades, with
each new incident becoming more grist for the mill. Most efforts to answer it
recognize that the raw data are full of ambiguities and inconsistencies. States
do not consistently take the same position on the use of defensive force
against nonstate actors. But faithful to the rulebook, lawyers insist on distilling all the data into a single conduct rule—defining in intelligible and generally applicable terms when defensive force against nonstate actors is
lawful. 178
173. E.g., Permanent Rep. of Australia to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 9, 2015 from the
Permanent Rep. of Australia to the U.N. addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015); Chargé d’affaires a.i., Letter dated 31 Mar. 2015 from the
Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/221 (Mar. 31, 2015); Permanent Rep.
of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter Dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent
Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N. Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014).
174. See Hakimi & Cogan, supra note 172, at 280–81.
175. See, e.g., U.S. WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS, supra
note 136, at 10.
176. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, Self-Defence Against Non-state Actors:
Are Powerful States Willing but Unable to Change International Law?, 67 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
263, 269–77 (2018) (reviewing recent practice).
177. Mission of Brazil to the U.N., Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mauro Vieira, Permanent Representative, to U.N. Security Council, Upholding International Law Within the Context of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (May 17, 2018),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/15CWYwX_G9K610xBWb7JmKelCOYHZDKSX/view [https://
perma.cc/8Z4Z-V7B5]; Républic Française, Droit International Appliqué aux Operations dans
le Cyberspace, at 10–11, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/droitinternat-appliqu%C3%A9-aux-op%C3%A9rations-cyberespace-france.pdf [https://perma.cc
/GX2U-6X5B].
178. Compare, e.g., NICO SCHRIJVER & LARISSA VAN DEN HERIK, LEIDEN POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 29, 32 (2010)
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That approach flattens all the discrepancies that affect how this area of
the jus ad bellum actually operates. For those who want to engage with or
understand the law on defensive force, the question of how a detached observer might distill all of the practice into a single, standalone rule is almost
completely beside the point. These people need to know what positions are
seriously in contention and to what extent, when, and by whom each position is likely to be accepted and treated as law. For instance, policymakers in
states that endorse the unable-or-unwilling position need to be advised that
it is not in fact a rule. Otherwise, they will be surprised to learn that their operations are in certain contexts not authoritative but rather regarded as lawless. They will be confused by the varied responses to their operations—the
fact that some operations compatible with the unable-or-unwilling position
garner broad support, 179 while others are only quietly tolerated, 180 and still
others are condemned. 181 They might also forego opportunities to try to earn
authority for particular operations in real time and thus increase their base
of support. In short, they will to varying degrees be caught off guard, misguided, or confused.
The rulebook conception is not just unhelpful here. It is pernicious. It
makes it harder, rather than easier, for people to partake in an important aspect of global life. It suggests that the kinds of questions that enable policymakers to make sense of and engage with CIL are somehow improper or
extraneous to law. After all, to ask and answer these questions is to do almost
the opposite of what the rulebook instructs—not to crystallize the law into
discernible, generally applicable rules but to highlight and examine the various positions that prevent any one of them from being a rule.
Some might wonder whether my account really provides more analytic
clarity. At least the rulebook tries to impose some order on CIL, they might
say. But there is a difference between analytic confusion and legal or factual
uncertainty. The rulebook conception causes confusion because it pretends

(purporting to “clarify[] the state of international law on the use of force against terrorists” and
endorsing the unable-or-unwilling position), and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, The Chatham House
Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 963,
963–64, 969 (2006) (recognizing that “the law in this area is politically and legally contentious”
but then purporting to “reflect current international law” and positing that the unable-orunwilling position is law), with Brunnée & Toope, supra note 176, at 264, 266 (arguing that,
while “the parameters of [self-defense] remain contested,” “the evidence does not support the
existence of [the unable-or-unwilling] standard in current customary law”).
179. An example is the coordinated campaign against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria. See infra Section V.B.2.
180. Examples include Ethiopia’s 2006–2007 incursion into Somalia and some U.S. drone
operations. For a discussion of these examples, see Hakimi & Cogan, supra note 172, at 284–
85.
181. For example, in 2008, both the Organization of American States and the Rio Group
of Latin American States condemned as unlawful Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador to target
a non-state rebel group. Org. of Am. States, Rep. of the OAS Comm’n that Visited Ecuador and
Colom., at 10, OEA/Ser.F/II.25 RC.25/doc 7/08 (Mar. 17, 2008) (reprinting Rio Group Declaration).
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that CIL is something that it is not. It impedes people from seeing CIL for
what it is and then making decisions on that basis. And it directs them toward methods of analysis that are at best irrelevant and at worst disorienting.
My account informs people of how CIL actually works. Decisionmakers
might be unsure of what to do with CIL or of how others will interact with it,
but they can at least map out its terrain, identify and assess their options, and
plan for different eventualities.
V.

NORMATIVE APPRAISALS

It’s bad enough that the rulebook conception directs lawyers to use analytic methods that are unsound. But this conception of CIL is corrosive for
another reason, as well. Recall that it is not just the dominant descriptive account of CIL, and not just a framework for analyzing CIL, but also the normative metric against which CIL is most often evaluated. The rulebook
conception portrays CIL’s non-rule-like qualities as a problem that must be
corrected or disavowed. 182
That normative logic systematically devalues CIL. Appraisals that assume that CIL must be like a rulebook do not even consider how CIL might
contribute to the global order by not conforming to a rulebook. I argue below that the result is to obscure and discount important work that CIL does
to: (1) limit biases in the law, (2) achieve normative settlements through law,
and (3) promote values that are associated with the rule of law. To be clear, I
am not saying that CIL always does every one of these things or that what it
does is always, on balance, desirable. I am also not saying that, if we were designing CIL for an ideal world, we would choose for it to operate as it does.
We might prefer for CIL to conform to the rulebook conception. But given
that it does not, that conception contributes to the immense skepticism of it.
The rulebook conception obscures much of the good that CIL (as it currently
operates) does. The implications for future efforts to appraise or reform CIL
are significant.
A. Limiting Bias
In insisting that CIL has certain secondary rules, the rulebook conception breeds a prominent set of attacks on its legitimacy. According to the
rulebook, the secondary rules help keep CIL consensual and therefore legitimate. 183 They are supposed to weed out tendentious claims about CIL—
claims that are biased in favor of some actors, at the expense of others—so
that CIL’s content has enough support to be legitimate as law.
This logic is evident in the ILC Conclusions. The accompanying commentary underscores that the metasecondary rule for CIL—the two-element
test—works to separate the wheat from the chaff. “It serves to ensure that the

182.
183.

See supra Section II.C.
ILC, Conclusions on CIL, supra note 13, at 122.
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exercise of identifying rules of customary international law results in determining only such rules as actually exist.” 184 Without the two-element test
and other secondary rules, the commentary explains, we cannot be sure that
a given practice has a sufficient degree of “acceptance among States that it
may be considered to be the expression of a legal right or obligation.” 185 The
secondary rules thus are supposed to save CIL from a serious legitimacy
problem. If people do not rigorously apply these rules, if they treat tendentious claims as CIL, then CIL will lack the requisite degree of acceptance to
create legitimate law. 186
The same logic animates the persistent attacks on CIL’s legitimacy. 187
Critics of CIL assume that the rulebook’s secondary rules are what keep it
consensual and therefore legitimate. They argue, however, that these secondary rules do not work. And in the absence of meaningful secondary rules, the
critics claim that CIL cannot be consensual or legitimate; it must just be a
foil for some actors—usually, the most powerful actors—to impose their
own biases on everyone else.
My account of CIL reveals that this logic is flawed. CIL derives what legitimacy it has not from any secondary rules but from the process through
which it is developed and used. Because this process is unstructured, and authority within it is diffusely held, normative positions must be accepted and
treated as CIL in order to have the force of CIL. Those who want a position
to be CIL must work to earn support for it from other participants in the
process. This serves to check (though not eliminate) the effect of biased or
tendentious claims in CIL. 188 A normative position becomes entrenched
enough to operate like a conduct rule only if it actually acquires widespread
support. The support that entrenches the rule also evinces some consensus
for it.
Positions that are more controversial are, almost by definition, less entrenched. These positions might still be invoked as law, but they can more
readily be challenged or evaded. A claim that a contested position is CIL can
184. Id. at 125.
185. Id.
186. This logic is also evident in how one ILC member has described the impetus for the
Conclusions. See Nolte, supra note 56, at 8–9. He explained that the failure to apply shared secondary rules creates the risks of bias and abuse; global actors might “use the available information selectively for the purpose of arriving at certain results.” Id. at 8. So, he said, “it is
important . . . to articulate and maintain a common standard, and to ascertain that the identification of customary rules is not done lightly. Otherwise, the authority and the value of customary international law as an important source of international law could diminish . . . .” Id. at 8–
9. Again, the suggestion is that CIL’s secondary rules must be established and rigorously applied in order for its content to be legitimate. Id.
187. See supra Section II.C.
188. See Stephen Toope, Powerful but Unpersuasive? The Role of the United States in the
Evolution of Customary International Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 287, 313 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003)
(“The fluidity of the processes of construction of customary law can be a shield against hegemonic control.”).
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easily be countered with a claim that it is not. The openness of the process is
what enables the participants to shield themselves from the CIL positions
with which they disagree. 189 Put differently, the fluidity and contingency in
CIL—the fact that it does not actually conform to the rulebook—limit the
risk that it will consistently reinforce the preferences of some actors, at the
expense of others. This does not mean that every position that is regarded
and treated as CIL is, in the specific settings in which it is used, legitimate. It
means that, even though certain uses of CIL might be illegitimate, the CIL
process creates ample opportunity to resist those uses and prevent their entrenchment, so that they are not systematically reproduced. The rulebook is
quite simply the wrong metric for evaluating CIL’s legitimacy.
So what’s the right metric? How should we assess the extent to which
CIL is contaminated by bias? My account suggests that the question cannot
meaningfully be answered in the abstract. Because CIL manifests in diverse
ways, those who want to evaluate or contest its legitimacy must examine how
it plays out in discrete settings. How, by whom, and with what effect is a particular position used as CIL? And does something about that use make it illegitimate or oppressive? For example, are there reasons to believe that the
position is being arbitrarily imposed, despite real opposition and without adequate opportunities to be challenged?
My account also offers three more discrete lessons for reform. First, insisting that CIL is or should be like a rulebook does not make it so. For all
the efforts to identify secondary rules for CIL, it still does not have any. The
ILC Conclusions and similar projects reflect a desire to establish such rules—
to make CIL more rule-like by imposing on it a set of secondary rules that
ensure that its conduct norms always manifest as primary rules. These efforts
should be better justified or abandoned. Those who want to turn CIL into a
rulebook should explain not only why its plasticity is such an immense problem (more on this below) 190 but also how their vision can realistically be
achieved, given what we already know: secondary rules are in many ways antithetical to the process for CIL and have repeatedly proven to be out of

189. See supra Part I. Skeptics sometimes contend that tendentious CIL claims have ripple effects that extend beyond the discrete settings in which they are made—that they corrode
all of CIL, including the parts that operate like rules, and degrade the entire enterprise of international law. E.g., Joyner, supra note 12, at 45; Tesón, supra note 87, at 109. This contention
lacks empirical support. But there is plenty of evidence to refute it. In the past few decades,
many CIL positions were entrenched and international law itself flourished. And as skeptics
themselves underscore, tendentious CIL claims were routine. Such claims were business as
usual in a vibrant legal order.
190. On the broader point that variability in the law’s content is not necessarily a problem, see Christopher L. Kutz, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of
Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997 (1994). Kutz argues that the “feature of luck at the heart of the legal system” is completely routine. Id. at 1027. Mature legal systems invariably have multiple, at times
conflicting sources of authority, such that different decisionmakers can reasonably reach contrary results. Id. Kutz explains that this elasticity “does not necessarily corrupt the conclusions
actually generated” because a specific decision “can still be defended by pointing to the reasons
supporting it.” Id. at 1027–28.
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reach. In the meantime, pretending that CIL is something that it is not has
real downsides; it contributes to the confusion and skepticism around CIL.
Second, because CIL draws its legitimacy from its own process, those
who worry about its legitimacy should focus on improving this process. Take
the concern that the process disproportionately benefits its most active participants—actors who expend the resources promoting their own priorities. 191 The solution is not to advise everyone else that the secondary rules
will save them. It is to help these actors participate on more equal terms. For
example, perhaps the United Nations or civil society groups could help historically marginalized actors advance their preferences through CIL. Or perhaps lawyers could routinely remind these actors that a position is not CIL
just because someone claims that it is. Or perhaps we could make more accessible the divergent positions that global actors take on discrete issues, so
that no one position solidifies due to the effective lobbying of a select few. In
any event, the goal should be to help disenfranchised groups participate in
the process, not to distract them with a bunch of fabricated secondary rules.
Third, although CIL is at times infected by bias, the solution is not always to formulate its content as conduct rules. Consider again the contest on
defensive force against nonstate actors. Because multiple CIL positions are in
play, no one of them operates as a rule. CIL’s fluidity enables militarily dominant states to push hard for their unable-or-unwilling position. But the
same fluidity enables other states to resist or challenge that position. Trying
to formulate this practice into a conduct rule might mean not removing the
unable-or-unwilling position from law but rather entrenching it as the rule
and therefore making it harder to resist. 192 As between that option and the
non-rule-like status quo, the status quo better protects the interests of other
states; it preserves space for them to continue pressing for their views and
undermining the position that favors militarily powerful states.
The point is that, if we aim to limit the biases in CIL, settling its content
in stable conduct rules is not always preferable to the alternatives. After all,
rules entrench certain positions in law. If their content is repulsive or oppressively imposed, then solidifying them in law is unappealing. The rulebook’s insistence that the conduct norms of CIL always manifest as primary
rules pushes in the direction of entrenchment, even when that is not the
most desirable or equitable result.
B. Achieving Normative Settlement
Assuming that any number of normative positions are reasonable and
legitimate, picking one and settling it in law has value that is independent of

191. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
192. Indeed, a number of expert reports have concluded that the unable-or-unwilling
position is the single best position on CIL. E.g., SCHRIJVER & VAN DEN HERIK, supra note 178,
¶¶ 29, 32; Wilmshurst, supra note 178, at 963–64, 969.
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its content. 193 Normative settlement can enhance CIL’s regulatory effect by
allowing people to know the consequences of their decisions and to coordinate their behavior accordingly. Although a better settlement is preferable to
a worse one, some settlement might be better than none at all. 194
The question for CIL is whether its elasticity makes it ill-suited to
achieve a settlement. Recall that this question underlies the debate about the
efficacy of CIL. Critics contend that, because CIL is so capacious, it has a
hard time settling what must be done—or therefore regulating behavior. The
participants can too easily argue their way out of their obligations. 195 This
critique suggests that CIL works best as a regulatory tool when its conduct
norms are sufficiently precise and entrenched to operate like rules and stymie further contest. The critique thus discounts the relevance of the normative material in CIL that is not rule-like. However, this material routinely
also contributes to normative settlements and has regulatory purchase.
1.

Settlement in Conduct Rules

An important strand of research already emphasizes that arguing in law
helps the participants find and settle on common normative positions—and
thus establish new conduct rules. 196 A legal contest invites the participants to
focus on the issue in dispute, to crystallize their own views, to feel out their
competition, and eventually to converge on conduct rules that they all are
willing to accept. The contest is not just a distraction from, a waystation for,
or an impediment to settlement. It often is essential to achieving a settlement.
CIL is an especially suitable vehicle for having these contests because it is
so pliable—not rigid, like rules. 197 Global actors can easily use CIL to advance a diverse range of legal claims and thus catalyze the kinds of interactions that generate new conduct rules. The resultant rules might stay in CIL
or might be prescribed in a new treaty. Remember what happened on the
continental shelf. 198 As the claims of coastal states gained traction, they were
codified as treaty rules and then accepted as rules of CIL. CIL’s malleability
facilitated the formation of these rules by giving states a relatively easy way

193. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 (1997) (“An important—perhaps the important—function
of law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is to be done . . . .”).
194. Id. at 1371.
195. See, e.g., notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
POLITICS AND ORGANIZATIONS 32 (2011) (“Legal argumentation . . . does help to solidify
agreement . . . .”).
197. I have argued elsewhere that CIL affirmatively invites and facilitates such conflicts.
See Monica Hakimi, The Work of International Law, 58 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 37–39 (2017). But I
need not press that point here. For present purposes, it is enough to say that global actors can
easily use CIL as a vehicle for having these conflicts.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 121–124.
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to instigate juris-generative interactions. All the United States had to do was
issue a proclamation advancing its legal claim. Here, the non-rule-like character of CIL was an ingredient for, not an impediment to, establishing stable
conduct rules that regulate behavior.
Of course, CIL’s plasticity can then work to undercut the very rules that
it helped to produce. Again, this would not necessarily be a problem. Rules
that had been desirable might become outmoded. Their downsides might be
newly apparent and significant. Or precisely because they function as rules,
they might be too crude to regulate certain governance issues. But in any
event, CIL rules do not always unravel. Some CIL rules are deeply entrenched and extremely hard to change, even though they are also at times
violated. The prohibition of torture is an example. 199 Moreover, where CIL
helps generate new conduct rules that are codified in treaty law, as it did on
the continental shelf, the settlement can be further insulated from CIL’s own
vicissitudes.
The key point is that CIL’s malleability does not consistently detract
from its capacity to establish stable conduct rules. Its malleability is sometimes how it produces such rules. Any effort to evaluate its efficacy along this
dimension thus should account not only for the part of CIL that already
manifests as rules but also for all of the other stuff that contributes to rule
formation, whether in CIL or in treaties that grow out of CIL. The rulebook
conception skews the analysis; it leads people to diminish the non-rule-like
material in CIL that helps to produce settled rules.
2.

Provisional Settlement

The normative settlements that CIL produces do not come only in the
form of rules. They are often only partial or provisional—settlements in the
sense that they reflect what the relevant group of actors accepts in a particular setting, at a given moment. Cass Sunstein’s concept of “incompletely theorized agreements” nicely captures the idea:
[W]ell-functioning legal systems often tend to adopt a special strategy for
producing agreement amidst pluralism. Participants in legal controversies
try to produce incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes.
They agree on the result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations
for it. They need not agree on fundamental principle. They do not offer
larger or more abstract explanations than are necessary to decide the
case. 200

Incompletely theorized agreements settle the law for specific contexts, without resolving the larger or deeper issues in dispute. CIL is effective in producing this kind of settlement precisely because it is not rule-like.

199. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 11, at 148, 153.
200. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1733, 1735–36 (1995).
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Return to the contest on defensive force against nonstate actors. Because
this contest is ongoing, it has not produced stable, consistently applied conduct rules. Nevertheless, we can discern the contours of a settlement. It looks
something like this: states that use defensive force against nonstate actors
usually do not face material or normative repercussions for their operations,
especially if they keep their force to a low level. Yet they do not have the full
authority of the law behind them, and they risk condemnation for their operations if they seem too trigger happy or if they have to defend themselves
before certain institutions, such as the ICJ. This settlement has been in place
for at least a few years, but it is unsteady. It can easily shift with a major incident or authoritative decision on defensive force, or a notable change in state
behavior. The settlement is not fixed or complete; it is partial and provisional. 201
Still, it allows the key players to know, more or less, where they stand
and establishes the normative backdrop against which they can make concrete decisions. A high-profile incident is illustrative. 202 In 2014, the socalled Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupied large areas of territory,
threatening not only those two states but also many others. Dozens of states
responded by participating in or assisting a U.S.-led military campaign to defeat ISIS. The campaign was conducted with the Iraqi government’s consent,
but the legal basis for using force in Syria was contested. Although states
widely supported the Syria part of the campaign, they disagreed about
whether or why it was lawful.
Then, in November 2015, states that wanted to bolster the anti-ISIS
campaign went to the U.N. Security Council and obtained Resolution
2249. 203 The resolution did not identify a legal basis for using force in Syria. 204 It left on the table, for states to fight over in future cases, the competing
normative positions on self-defense. Yet it also called on states “to take all
necessary measures, in compliance with international law . . . to eradicate the
safe haven [ISIS has] established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria.” 205
The practical effect of Resolution 2249 was to confer authority on the antiISIS operation; after the Council adopted the resolution, the claim that the
operation was unlawful became much harder to sustain. 206 The resolution
thus shifted the terms of the above settlement on defensive force for this
case, while leaving that settlement largely intact for future cases.
The incident is instructive for four reasons. First, the settlements here—
both the default settlement that operated in the background and the more
specific settlement that is reflected in Resolution 2249—were partial and

201. For evidence of this settlement, see supra notes 172–177 and accompanying text.
202. For the facts of this incident, see the sources cited supra in note 172.
203. S.C. Res. 2249 (Nov. 20, 2015).
204. Id.
205. Id. ¶ 5.
206. I defend this assertion in more detail in Hakimi, The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory
Form, supra note 172, at 187–89.
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provisional because states disagree on what the rule on defensive force
should be. Given that they disagree, CIL’s malleability made a settlement
more, rather than less, likely. States almost certainly would have had a harder
time agreeing on Resolution 2249 if they first had to define the generally applicable rule in this area. They indicated that the anti-ISIS campaign was, for
all intents and purposes, lawful by leaving open the broader question that it
presented.
Second, although this area of the jus ad bellum does not manifest as a
conduct rule, it appears to have had a regulatory effect. A number of states
that supported the anti-ISIS campaign hesitated to use force in Syria until
the Security Council adopted Resolution 2249. 207 The ambiguity in the law
before then appears to have impeded these states from doing what they
wanted to do. It also might have influenced the conduct of states that acted
without Resolution 2249. For example, the contest surrounding the unableor-unwilling position gave the United States incentives to try to earn authority for the campaign by coordinating with Iraq, pressing other states to support or participate in the campaign, and eventually working in the Council
to obtain Resolution 2249. 208 The jus ad bellum need not manifest as conduct
rules—or operate like a rulebook—in order to have regulatory purchase.
Third, if one prizes legal settlements for reducing uncertainty and allowing people to evaluate the costs and benefits of different courses of action,
the jus ad bellum seems to have served that function. There is little indication that, as states were deciding what to do about ISIS, they were confused
about the jus ad bellum’s terrain. To be clear, they might have had doubts
about how best to navigate this terrain—how to balance the competing considerations that were at issue. But the main players appeared to appreciate
the legal implications and risks of the options that were available to them. 209
Fourth, the incident supports my earlier point about CIL’s legitimacy.
To accept the usual narrative about CIL’s illegitimacy—which, again, is that
CIL is just a tool for subjugation 210—we need a more refined account of how
CIL embeds bias in a case like this one, where its content was porous and
contingent. The evidence is mixed. Although a number of militarily dominant states now insist that the unable-or-unwilling position is law, that position was insufficiently entrenched in law to give them all of the authority
that they wanted to bolster their exercise of military power against ISIS. 211
They had to earn at least some of that authority by building broad support
for their operation both within and outside of the Council. Here, CIL’s plia-

207. See id. at 190.
208. See Hakimi, Defensive Force, supra note 172, at 25–26; Hakimi & Cogan, supra note
172, at 281–82.
209. See, e.g., Hakimi, The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory Form, supra note 172, at 188; Hakimi, Defensive Force, supra note 172, at 28.
210. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
211. See Hakimi, The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory Form, supra note 172, at 187–89, 187
n.187.
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bility was a vehicle not just for imposing the U.S. will on everyone else but
for rallying many others behind and garnering broad support for the campaign.
The jus ad bellum’s content in this area thus remains fluid and contestable but not without settlement. To date, the settlements have been loose
enough for the broader normative contest on defensive force to continue.
But they have been fixed enough to allow for some predictability in the law’s
likely application in concrete settings. And they have been important enough
to have a material impact. They have been partial and provisional but still
real. If one assumes that normative settlements in CIL must come in the
form of conduct rules, one misses the ways in which it produces settlements
by not operating as rules. The effect, again, is to diminish CIL’s operational
relevance.
C. Promoting Rule of Law Values
Partial and provisional settlements might strike some readers as undesirable for reasons that relate to the rule of law. The rule of law is an ideal
type that generally refers not to what law is in a jurisprudential sense but to
what makes law, as a political project, desirable. Why and under what conditions should we aspire to live in a society governed by law? Although opinions on that question differ, many accounts of the rule of law define it with
criteria that resemble a rulebook. The rule of law is said to require constraining how public officials exercise power by establishing and then consistently
and impartially applying relatively fixed conduct rules. 212 These accounts of
the rule of law provide more ammunition for the rulebook’s normative logic—for discounting the part of CIL that does not manifest as conduct
rules. 213
However, the non-rule-like part of CIL fares much better under accounts of the rule of law that prioritize what might be called its “argumentative dimension.” Here, the rule of law is less about constraining state
discretion or establishing stable conduct rules than it is about “commit[ing]
to a certain method of arguing about the exercise of public power.” 214 The
idea is that the rule of law is advanced when people in power take seriously
the task of explaining publicly why they think they have the authority to

212. For evidence that these accounts inform how many people think about the international rule of law, see, for example, U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), and
Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 342 (2008). For
arguments that the accounts are inapt or insufficiently substantiated for the international context, see IAN HURD, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–46 (2017), and Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?, 22 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 315 (2011).
213. See supra Section II.C.
214. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate, in DWORKIN AND HIS
CRITICS 319, 330 (Justine Burley ed., 2004).
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make particular decisions, and external actors can then scrutinize and challenge those justifications and demand a reasoned response. 215
The argumentative dimension of the rule of law is valuable because it
helps preserve the foundational distinction between sheer power and legitimate authority. 216 Arguing about authority highlights that authority matters—that material control is not a sufficient basis for making particular
governance decisions. Governance decisions must instead be tied to some
authority, which itself must be earned, identified, and continuously defended. Put differently, the people in power must justify how and toward what
ends they use their power. They must show not only that they can control a
situation but that they may, that they have the right to rule as they want to
do.
This dimension of the rule of law was not lost, for example, in the ISIS
incident. States consistently acted like having international legal authority
for the operation against ISIS mattered. Some states tried to justify the operation with the unable-or-unwilling position. Others offered narrower positions that were more tailored to the facts. Still others asserted that the
operation was consistent with the jus ad bellum, without explaining precisely
why. And several declined to participate in the Syria part of the campaign
until the Security Council “cured” what they perceived to be a deficiency in
authority. 217 We can debate why states cared about establishing their authority in this incident or why they sought to preserve their longer term positions
on the law. But we should not discount the fact that they did.

215. My claim here is in tension with two prominent strands of thought about international legal argumentation. First, many suggest that irresolvable normative contests fall outside
the law, in the realm of ordinary politics. E.g., SHAW, supra note 6, at 12 (“Power politics stresses competition, conflict and supremacy . . . [while] law aims for harmony and the regulation of
disputes.”). One motivation for relegating these contests to the domain of politics is to prevent
the people in power from harnessing law’s normative valence to reinforce their own preferences. If the people in power can claim that the law is whatever they want it to be, then (the
reasoning goes) they can use law’s authority to bolster their own power. This reasoning overstates the downsides of the argumentative dimension. Tendentious legal claims do not by
themselves constitute authority. Those who make such claims in an effort to get the law on
their side must build support for their positions; they must earn authority for what they want
to do from other participants in the process. If they do not, their claims can easily be dismissed.
By contrast, putting contested issues outside the law suggests that, on those issues, people may
exercise their power as they like, without any expectation that they defend a decision in law or
subject it to legal challenge. It’s not clear how that outcome would contribute to the rule of law.
Second, the usual explanation for why legal arguments are valuable is that they allow disparate actors to accept and converge on shared norms. Some suggest that that is the only good
reason to have a legal argument. E.g., JOHNSTONE, supra note 196, at 7 (“If no one can say with
authority what the law is . . . what would be the point of making legal arguments at all?”). My
claim is that normative settlement is not the only or even the primary reason to care about legal arguments. The argumentative dimension of the rule of law is valuable even when it does
not lead to settlement.
216. I develop this argument in more depth in Hakimi, supra note 24, at 1305.
217. For a review of states’ normative positions in this case, see Brunnée & Toope, supra
note 176, at 269–73.
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Although CIL’s argumentative dimension can have regulatory force, it
does not necessarily do so through stable conduct rules. It affects behavior by
creating the conditions under which governance decisions are routinely justified, scrutinized, and insofar as they are perceived to be lacking, undermined. Moreover, even when the argumentative dimension does not serve
this kind of regulatory function, it promotes other values that are associated
with the rule of law. The expectation that governance decisions must be justified in law presses the participants to think about what they are doing under the law and why, to explain their reasons to people who care, and to
confront and grapple with arguments to the contrary. If nothing else, Mark
Tushnet says, this argumentative practice “express[es] respect for people as
reasoning (and reasonable) beings,” which “does seem an unqualified human
good.” 218 Along similar lines, Jeremy Waldron explains that what we often
value in law is that it “occasions, frames, and facilitates a certain process of
reflection and argument, rather than just the mechanical conformity of behaviour to an empirically or even numerically defined requirement.” 219 The
point is that the rule of law is about much more than just defining and following a bunch of rules. 220
We might in the abstract want to advance all of the attributes that are associated with the rule of law. We might want to foster justification and debate, while also establishing conduct rules that limit official discretion. But as
a practical matter, these facets of the rule of law routinely push in different
directions and require tradeoffs. Prioritizing the argumentative dimension
often means tolerating greater levels of discretion, unpredictability, and inconsistency in the law’s application. 221 Law best fosters justification and debate by staying elastic and contestable—such that people can use it to
advance different positions—not by establishing clear rules that are mechanically applied.
The tradeoff is not always worth making. The question of whether it is
depends on the specific interests and values that are at stake and on the political economy in which the law operates. In some circumstances, constraining
official discretion through settled conduct rules is both possible and important. But as discussed, it can also be infeasible or repressive. The key insight for now is that no matter whether we ultimately prioritize the
argumentative dimension, it is a rule-of-law good. It might not be everything

218. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and the Rule of Law 12 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 18-14, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3135903 [https://perma.cc/RF6U-FBXG].
219. Waldron, supra note 214, at 336–37.
220. See, e.g., SAMANTHA BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT: REASONABLE
DISAGREEMENT AND THE LAW 117 (2005) (“Knowing precisely where we stand is not always
the point of a provision: instead, the point may be to ensure that certain reasonable debates
take place in our society rather than to settle them entirely.”); Kutz, supra note 190, at 1029
(“The ideal of the rule of law is far better served by lively debate than by wooden consensus
because debate renders the law’s many values perspicuous in the actual exercise of authority.”).
221. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2008).
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that the rule of law requires, or what we most prize about the rule of law, but
it is not nothing. It has independent value.
CIL is particularly good at promoting this dimension of the rule of law
because it is so elastic. Global actors can tap into CIL to defend or challenge
a broad range of governance decisions. 222 CIL does real good when the people who hold positions of power invoke it to try to establish authority for
their decisions or when affected audiences use it to scrutinize or contest particular decisions. The argumentative dimension might be especially valuable
when it does not come at the expense of stable conduct rules—when the alternative is not for the conduct at issue to be regulated through conduct
rules but for that conduct to occur outside of the law, without any expectation that it be tied to a source of authority and justified in those terms. But
again, the argumentative dimension has value even when the tradeoff must
be made.
Return to the hypothetical involving the hydroelectric power plant. Assume now that the state that builds the plant does not try to justify the decision to its neighbors but that they invoke the precautionary principle as CIL
to complain. They do so, even though the principle’s status and content in
CIL are unsettled. Advancing the precautionary principle as CIL is a way for
these states to contest a decision that affects them, to push the acting state to
defend its decision in law, and to argue with it about how best to balance environmental protection against other regulatory goals. That dynamic is valuable from a rule-of-law perspective, no matter whether the participants all
come away from the experience with the same understanding of whether or
why the decision was lawful. If the alternative is not that the acting state is
controlled but that it does whatever it pleases, while others lose a vehicle
through which to contest its authority and justify pressing their opposing
views, the rule-of-law downsides are negligible.
The implications for reform are straightforward. The best way to enhance the argumentative dimension of CIL is not to clamp down on the part
of it that does not manifest as rules. It is to reinvigorate that part—to push
global actors to justify or challenge particular exercises of power by invoking
CIL, even when their normative positions are splintered and contingent, rather than stable or entrenched. In other words, we should make it harder,
not easier, for states to disengage from the argumentative dimension simply
by asserting, as the rulebook encourages them to do, that CIL does not exist
in the absence of rules.
Let me drill down on two last points for those who still cling to the rulebook conception. First, some might intuit that CIL’s argumentative practice
itself requires the rulebook. We know that it doesn’t. Global actors regularly
engage in this practice—they invoke, argue about, and justify their decisions
in CIL—even though CIL does not operate like a rulebook. But, skeptics
might say, perhaps we need to pretend that CIL is like a rulebook in order for
them to continue engaging with this practice. Why would that be so? The
222.

See supra Part I.
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recognition that CIL does not conform to the rulebook conception would
probably reduce the rote invocations of the two-element test (and good riddance!), but global actors have plenty of other moves for arguing about and
justifying particular positions in CIL. The ILC Conclusions list a bunch of
them. 223 Although these moves do not function like rules, they still structure
much of the discourse on CIL. They remain available, even if we
acknowledge that they are not rules. Indeed, discarding the rulebook conception should make them more, not less, appealing; it would clarify that positions that do not satisfy the supposedly high threshold of the two-element
test can still have force as CIL—and thus can be worth pursuing in CIL.
The second point is jurisprudential. Some might accept my earlier argument that CIL need not operate like a rulebook to be law. 224 But they
might contend that CIL cannot be law, where it only structures an argumentative practice, without authoritatively resolving what ought to be done,
whether in generally applicable conduct rules or through more provisional
settlements. I disagree. Law does all sorts of things beyond establishing action-guiding prescriptions. The common distinction between law’s regulatory and constitutive functions might be useful here. Recall from the ISIS
example that CIL can have regulatory purchase, even when its content is
contested. The jus ad bellum shaped the military behavior of some states,
both before and after the Security Council adopted Resolution 2249, despite
the contest about its content. 225 However, even assuming that CIL has no
regulatory effect in a given context, it still might have a constitutive one. It
might structure a certain kind of argumentative practice. This practice is
quintessentially legal in nature so long as it centers on the authority to make
particular governance decisions and places this authority outside the hands
of any one player. Again, constituting this kind of argumentative practice is
not everything that we want law to do, but it is not nothing. And it happens
to be something that CIL does particularly well.
CONCLUSION
The rulebook conception that dominates current thinking on CIL is not
only incorrect but insidious. This conception is too dissociated from the everyday practice of CIL to describe, with any degree of accuracy, what CIL is to
the many people who come across or interact with it. Nothing about the
rulebook conception is jurisprudentially required. It interferes with or is irrelevant to sound legal analysis. And because it defines CIL so stringently, to
include only that which manifests as rules, it systematically obscures and devalues much of the good that CIL does, and favors pushing CIL in directions
that are at best ill-considered and at worst counterproductive. We should retire the rulebook conception and acknowledge that CIL is a more variable,

223.
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See supra Section III.A.1.
See supra Section III.B; supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 207–208 and accompanying text.
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enigmatic kind of law. Or at least, we should push those who insist on preserving the rulebook conception to explain the reasons why. What exactly do
they think they gain by pretending that CIL is something that it is not?

1538

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:1487

